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ABSTRACT—According to the standard account in American corporate law, 
states compete to supply corporate law to American corporations, with 
Delaware dominating the market. This “competition” metaphor in turn 
informs some of the most important policy debates in American corporate 
law. 
This Article complicates the standard account, introducing foreign 
nations as emerging lawmakers that compete with American states in the 
increasingly globalized market for corporate law. In recent decades, 
entrepreneurial foreign nations in offshore islands have used permissive 
corporate governance rules and specialized business courts to attract publicly 
traded American corporations. Aided in part by a select group of private 
sector lawyers who draft legislation for these lawmakers, foreign nations 
enable American corporations to opt out of mandatory rules that are 
axiomatic features of American corporate law. 
This Article documents an emerging international market for corporate 
law that has largely been undetected by legal scholars who presuppose an 
interstate market. While acknowledging the potential benefits offered by 
foreign nations competing to attract American corporations, this Article 
highlights a series of countervailing considerations that render any claims 
about gains from international jurisdictional competition premature at best. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The United States seems cut off from the rest of the world when it 
comes to corporate law. Legal scholars take as virtual gospel that corporate 
law is a matter of state law,1 and that states compete to sell their laws to 
corporations by supplying corporate charters.2 Delaware is widely regarded 
 
 1 See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Creeping Federalization of Corporate Law, 26 REGULATION 
26, 26 (2003) (“For over 200 years, corporate governance has been a matter for state law.”). 
 2 See ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW 1–3 (1993) [hereinafter 
ROMANO, GENIUS]. 
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as the winner in this competition. Supplying corporate law to more than 66% 
of Fortune 500 companies,3 Delaware remains the central focus of academic 
studies and a transactional lawyer’s prized tool kit.4 For nearly half a century, 
corporate law scholarship has been dominated by discussions about whether 
other states put competitive pressure on Delaware and whether this 
competition is normatively desirable.5 
There is a missing piece to this important body of scholarship. Until 
now, legal scholars have neglected to consider foreign nations as 
jurisdictions that compete with Delaware to supply corporate law.6 This is 
not particularly surprising. When theorists in economics and law laid the 
theoretical foundations of corporate law in the 1970s and 1980s,7 there was 
little reason to consider the corporate law of foreign nations within the 
framework of American corporate law.8 At that time, only a small fraction of 
 
 3 See About the Division of Corporations, DEL. DIVISION CORP., 
https://corp.delaware.gov/aboutagency/ [https://perma.cc/5RDG-TKQW]. 
 4 See Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Symbiotic Federalism and the Structure of Corporate Law, 
58 VAND. L. REV. 1573, 1574 (2005) (noting that Delaware “has long been viewed as the de facto national 
corporate law”). 
 5 Much of this discussion concerns whether a particular state law affords adequate protection for 
shareholders and whether that protection ought to be left to private choice. Compare Ralph K. Winter, 
Jr., State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251, 256 
(1977) [hereinafter Winter, State Law] (“States seeking corporate charters will thus try to provide legal 
systems which optimize the shareholder-corporation relationship.”), with Lucian Arye Bebchuk, 
Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable Limits on State Competition in Corporate Law, 
105 HARV. L. REV. 1435, 1454 (1992) [hereinafter Bebchuk, Desirable Limits] (“[T]o the extent that we 
find that a state’s interest in attracting incorporations will be served by adopting undesirable rules, we 
can conclude that state competition is detrimental.”). In recent decades, Professor Mark Roe’s work has 
complicated this picture by introducing the federal government as the de facto second American corporate 
lawmaker. See, e.g., Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Competition, 117 HARV. L. REV. 588 (2003) [hereinafter 
Roe, Delaware’s Competition]. 
 6 A brief word on terminology may be useful here. I use the term “foreign nations” loosely in this 
Article, referring to jurisdictions with internationally recognized lawmaking authority. My definition thus 
includes jurisdictions like the Cayman Islands and Bermuda that are technically not full sovereigns under 
international law, see JAMES CRAWFORD, THE CREATION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 282–84 
(2d ed. 2006), but whose corporate lawmaking authority has been unquestioned under domestic 
jurisprudence. See, e.g., In re Kingate Mgmt. Ltd. Litig., No. 09-CV-5386 (DAB), 2016 WL 5339538, at 
*15–16 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 21, 2016) (“The fact that Madoff and his fraudulent scheme arose out of New 
York is not sufficient to override BVI’s interests in regulating the relationship between BVI corporations 
and their shareholders. Accordingly, the Court finds that BVI law applies to the issue of standing.”). 
 7 Michael Klausner, Fact and Fiction in Corporate Law and Governance, 65 STAN. L. REV. 1325, 
1326 (2013). 
 8 American corporate law was traditionally framed within the policy debate over federalism, with 
state corporate codes being conceptualized as products “whose producers are states and whose consumers 
are corporations.” ROMANO, GENIUS, supra note 2, at 6. The standard account implicitly limits the 
“suppliers” of American corporate law to the constituent states of the United States. See id.; see also 
FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 5 
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American companies were incorporated in foreign nations.9 Moreover, 
leading scholars have long assumed that the internal affairs doctrine—a 
conflict of laws principle that corporations can opt into any state’s corporate 
law without regard to the location of their physical operations—only applies 
to states in the United States.10 If federal and state courts do not honor the 
choices of corporations to incorporate abroad, foreign nations cannot 
seriously compete with Delaware. But as I document below, judges routinely 
extend the internal affairs doctrine for firms incorporated outside of the 
United States.11 Texas-based consumer giant Helen of Troy, Los Angeles-
based weight management company Herbalife, and Kentucky-based clothing 
company Fruit of the Loom are among hundreds of companies that are 
effectively governed by the corporate law of foreign nations.12 
This Article develops a theoretical framework that accounts for the 
emerging international market for corporate law. It contends that a handful 
of foreign jurisdictions, including Bermuda, the British Virgin Islands, and 
the Cayman Islands, have become emerging “laboratories” of corporate law 
offering attractive corporate governance rules for publicly traded 
corporations that principally operate outside of those jurisdictions.13 
American corporations are not immune to their seduction. These 
jurisdictions—especially those I identify as “offshore corporate law 
havens”14—are already global market leaders for certain types of closely held 
 
(1991) (“Managers in the United States must select the place of incorporation. The fifty states offer 
different menus of devices (from voting by shareholders to fiduciary rules to derivative litigation) for the 
protection of investors.”). 
 9 See infra Section II.A. 
 10 See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, The Race for the Bottom in Corporate Governance, 95 VA. L. 
REV. 685, 698 (2009) [hereinafter Easterbrook, Race for the Bottom] (“[T]his country does not recognize 
an internal-affairs doctrine in its dealings with other nations.” (emphasis omitted)). 
 11 See infra Section I.B. 
 12 See generally William J. Moon, Regulating Offshore Finance, 72 VAND. L. REV. 1, 12–15 (2019) 
[hereinafter Moon, Regulating Offshore Finance] (explaining how particular industries have established 
practices of setting up headquarters in offshore jurisdictions); Eric L. Talley, Corporate Inversions and 
the Unbundling of Regulatory Competition, 101 VA. L. REV. 1649, 1748–51 (2015) (compiling corporate 
inversion transactions involving U.S. target companies between 1994 and 2014). 
 13 Conceptualizing jurisdictions as laboratories was popularized by Justice Louis Brandeis in New 
State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, explaining that a “[s]tate may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and 
try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.” 285 U.S. 262, 311 
(1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Professor Roberta Romano extended this concept to the corporate law 
ecosystem, referring to states as “fifty laboratories.” ROMANO, GENIUS, supra note 2, at 5. 
 14 As I further elaborate in Part II, I use the term “offshore corporate law havens” in this Article 
principally to refer to three jurisdictions that have successfully attracted clients based in the United States: 
the Cayman Islands, Bermuda, and the British Virgin Islands. See E. EDWARD SIEMENS, OFFSHORE 
COMPANY LAW 9 (2009). While all three jurisdictions are self-governing British Overseas Territories 
(voluntarily), they each exercise almost full discretion when it comes to enacting legislation on corporate 
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business entities, including mutual funds, hedge funds, and trusts.15 But these 
offshore jurisdictions are also starting to compete seriously for publicly 
traded corporations. Today, foreign nations are juridical homes to over 14% 
of large publicly traded corporations listed in American securities markets.16 
There is virtually no literature on whether and to what extent foreign 
nations compete with American states to supply corporate law. While legal 
scholars and policymakers alike have been acutely aware of domestic 
corporations reincorporating in offshore “tax havens,”17 they have diagnosed 
the phenomenon as a problem of tax.18 While insightful, the foreign 
incorporation trend cannot be entirely attributed to tax incentives. 
As this Article will show, offshore corporate law havens in recent 
decades have built sophisticated legal infrastructures that enable them to 
compete with Delaware. For one, they have attracted a select group of 
foreign lawyers who help lawmakers in these jurisdictions draft “cutting 
edge” corporate law statutes. These lawmakers also rely heavily on 
incorporation fees for government revenues,19 allowing them to credibly 
commit to retaining laws that are attractive to the private sector.20 Because 
the population of offshore corporate law havens tends to be a fraction of even 
sparsely populated states in the United States,21 these jurisdictions can enact 
 
law. The focus of this Article on these three jurisdictions is aimed at defining the concept of an 
international market for corporate law and should not be taken to suggest that other foreign nations 
besides these offshore jurisdictions do not or cannot attract American corporations. Indeed, many foreign 
nations, including Ireland and the Marshall Islands, have had some success in drawing publicly traded 
companies listed in American securities markets. 
 15 Moon, Regulating Offshore Finance, supra note 12, at 1, 3. 
 16 See infra Section II.A. 
 17 See, e.g., RONEN PALAN ET AL., TAX HAVENS: HOW GLOBALIZATION REALLY WORKS 8–9 (2010) 
(“[T]ax havens are places or countries (not all of them are sovereign states) that have sufficient autonomy 
to write their own tax, finance, and other laws and regulations . . . . Tax havens are used, as their name 
suggests, to avoid and evade taxes.”); Victor Fleischer, Regulatory Arbitrage, 89 TEX. L. REV. 227, 276 
(2010) (“In some circumstances, managers will opt to minimize taxes by choosing a tax haven or tax-
friendly jurisdiction, even if that jurisdiction is suboptimal from the standpoint of corporate law.”). 
 18 See, e.g., Mitchell A. Kane & Edward B. Rock, Corporate Taxation and International Charter 
Competition, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1229, 1230 (2008) (observing that offshore incorporation is 
“unabashedly all about tax reduction”). 
 19 The British Virgin Islands, for instance, has derived approximately half of its government revenues 
from annual incorporation fees in recent years. See infra Section II.B. 
 20 A benign, economic-centric view would assess that the additional suppliers of corporate law lower 
the transactional cost for creating standard templates of corporate governance rules. See infra Section 
III.B. A more cynical view would be that their lawmakers are easily “captured” by private interests and 
thereby prone to producing rules that may not be desirable from the society’s standpoint. See infra Section 
III.B. 
 21 For instance, estimates show the population of the Cayman Islands is 61,944 compared to 961,939 
in Delaware and 2,998,039 in Nevada. See Central America: Cayman Islands, CENT. INTELLIGENCE 
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legislation swiftly in response to private sector demand. They also do not 
confront the type of democratic accountability facing larger nations, or even 
large states like New York or California, in part because they specialize in 
producing laws for corporations that do not physically operate within their 
territories.22 
Skeptical readers may point to the “unique” legal system in Delaware 
that is said to make it near impossible for any other jurisdiction to mount a 
serious challenge to Wilmington’s corporate law empire. I do not seek to 
rehash the extensive and illuminating literature identifying Delaware’s 
judicial system—particularly the renowned Delaware Court of Chancery—
as the predominant competitive advantage enjoyed by Delaware over other 
states.23 Indeed, many foreign jurisdictions do not offer a Delaware-style 
legal system famous for producing an abundance of well-reasoned and fact-
specific case law appearing on Westlaw and Lexis. Instead, many legal 
proceedings offshore take place in secret, and full-length opinions are 
frequently unpublished or available only to insiders.24 
These jurisdictions compete not by carbon copying Delaware’s 
judiciary, but rather by offering dispute resolution fora functionally similar 
to modern commercial arbitration. Like arbitration,25 courts in offshore 
 
AGENCY, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/cj.html 
[https://perma.cc/TVX3-C95L]; Delaware, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://data.census.gov/cedsci/ 
profile?q=Delaware&g=0400000US10&table=DP05&tid=ACSDP1Y2018.DP05 
[https://perma.cc/6JUM-KRBL]; Nevada, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://data.census.gov/cedsci/ 
profile?q=Nevada&g=0400000US32&table=DP05&tid=ACSDP1Y2018.DP05 
[https://perma.cc/FN9W-V9NL]. 
 22 Indeed, offshore corporate law havens have enacted laws specifically for “exempted” or 
“excepted” companies, which are designed for foreign business entities that do not (and in many instances 
legally cannot) conduct any business in their territories. See Moon, Regulating Offshore Finance, supra 
note 12, at 8–9. It is no coincidence that offshore incorporations havens are small in terms of population. 
As is the case for Delaware, the small size of a jurisdiction minimizes competing political lobbies and 
immunizes lawmakers from domestic factions that have interests in shaping corporate governance rules. 
See Curtis Alva, Delaware and the Market for Corporate Charters: History and Agency, 15 DEL. J. CORP. 
L. 885, 918–19 (1990); Bebchuk, Desirable Limits, supra note 5, at 1452; John C. Coffee, Jr., The Future 
of Corporate Federalism: State Competition and the New Trend Toward De Facto Federal Minimum 
Standards, 8 CARDOZO L. REV. 759, 762–63 (1987). 
 23 See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch, The Peculiar Role of the Delaware Courts in the Competition for Corporate 
Charters, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 1061, 1064 (2000) [hereinafter Fisch, Peculiar Role] (attributing Delaware’s 
success in attracting corporate charters to “the unique lawmaking function of the Delaware courts”); 
Edward B. Rock, Saints and Sinners: How Does Delaware Corporate Law Work?, 44 UCLA L. REV. 
1009, 1017 (1997) [hereinafter Rock, Saints and Sinners] (asserting that the judgment of Delaware courts 
plays an important role in evolving nonlegal norms of conduct). 
 24 See infra Section II.D. 
 25 Arbitration is a consent-based dispute resolution mechanism touted for offering efficient and 
expert proceedings. See Stephen J. Ware, Default Rules from Mandatory Rules: Privatizing Law Through 
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corporate law havens resolve disputes without juries.26 Judges serving in 
these courts, like arbitrators, are credentialed business law jurists, including 
partners at major international law firms who fly in from overseas to preside 
over cases ad hoc.27 
This account complicates some of the fundamental theoretical building 
blocks underlying the study of American corporate law. Whereas several 
prominent academics have assessed that other states do not vigorously 
compete to give a run for Delaware’s money, thus dubbing the interstate 
competition story a “myth,”28 this Article suggests that a handful of foreign 
nation states are actively vying to gain a share of the American corporate law 
market. Thus, even if state-to-state competition is or will remain weak,29 
state-to-nation state competition may be alive and kicking, albeit not with 
the same set of consequences that the standard interstate framework would 
have us believe. 
For example, offshore corporate law havens allow firms to opt out of a 
range of corporate governance rules—including the ability of shareholders 
to bring derivative suits for mismanagement—that are axiomatic features of 
American corporate law.30 While Delaware corporate law is predominantly 
made up of “enabling” default rules that leave significant discretion to 
 
Arbitration, 83 MINN. L. REV. 703, 723 n.90 (1999) (discussing the reduced cost and delay associated 
with arbitration). 
 26 See infra Section II.D. 
 27 See infra Section II.D. 
 28 Marcel Kahan & Ehud Kamar, The Myth of State Competition in Corporate Law, 55 STAN. L. REV. 
679, 684 (2002) [hereinafter Kahan & Kamar, Myth] (“[T]he very notion that states compete for 
incorporation is a myth. Other than Delaware, no state is engaged in significant efforts to attract 
incorporations of public companies.”). 
 29 This premise is contested. For instance, Professor Romano maintains that “given Delaware’s 
dominance, most other states engage in defensive competition, acting to retain domestic corporations, 
rather than seeking to lure corporations away from Delaware and unseat it as the market leader.” Roberta 
Romano, Market for Corporate Law Redux, in 2 THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS: 
PRIVATE AND COMMERCIAL LAW 358, 361–62 (Francesco Parisi ed., 2017) [hereinafter Romano, 
Corporate Law Redux]. Others have argued that at least Delaware and Nevada “are vigorously attempting 
to attract out-of-state incorporations.” Michal Barzuza, Market Segmentation: The Rise of Nevada as a 
Liability-Free Jurisdiction, 98 VA. L. REV. 935, 994 (2012). 
 30 Of course, the desirability of a liberal derivative suit regime is disputed (after all, defending 
frivolous suits is costly). See John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plaintiff’s Attorney: The Implications 
of Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86 COLUM. 
L. REV. 669, 692 (1986); Jessica Erickson, Corporate Misconduct and the Perfect Storm of Shareholder 
Litigation, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 75, 86 (2008); Charles J. Goetz, Verdict on Corporate Liability Rules 
and the Derivative Suit: Not Proven, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 344 (1986) (evaluating the argument regarding 
the effect of derivative suits on stock prices). But the general availability of derivative suits is said to 
serve the dual purpose of compensating the injured shareholders and deterring managerial misconduct. 
See Carol B. Swanson, Juggling Shareholder Rights and Strike Suits in Derivative Litigation: The ALI 
Drops the Ball, 77 MINN. L. REV. 1339, 1345–46 (1993). 
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private choice,31 it includes a number of “mandatory” rules ranging from 
fiduciary duty of loyalty to shareholder inspection rights.32 These are rules 
that even the most sophisticated corporations cannot waive compliance of 
through contract. Viewed in this light, foreign jurisdictions enable 
corporations to opt out of certain mandatory rules that may not be possible 
in the pure domestic setting. This descriptive account thereby reorients the 
normative debate concerning the proper boundaries and function of 
corporate law. 
By proposing an update to the interstate race framework underlying the 
study of “American” corporate law,33 this Article also adds an important 
normative dimension critical to understanding a number of areas tertiary to 
corporate law. After all, the interstate corporate charter competition literature 
has been influential in a number of important areas of the law, including 
bankruptcy law, tax policy, conflict of laws, trust law, environmental law, 
and securities regulation.34 
 
 31 See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 8, at 2 (“The corporate code in almost every state is an 
‘enabling’ statute. An enabling statute allows managers and investors to write their own tickets, to 
establish systems of governance without substantive scrutiny from a regulator.”); Lawrence A. 
Hamermesh, The Policy Foundations of Delaware Corporate Law, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1749, 1752 
(2006) (describing the Delaware corporate lawmaking process as driven in part by “enhancing flexibility 
to engage in private ordering”). 
 32 See infra Section III.A. 
 33 I use quotes around “American” because there has been little systematic reflection about what 
American corporate law even means. Scholars have long assumed it to mean corporate governance rules 
produced by American states, supplemented with federal laws setting minimum standards. That seems 
fair enough. But if we remove two shaky theoretical building blocks underlying that assumption—that 
firms operating within the United States only shop among the corporate law of American states and that 
the internal affairs doctrine only applies between states of the United States—it appears that we also ought 
to care about the corporate law of foreign nations chosen by corporations with substantial factual nexus 
to the United States. To put it bluntly with an extreme example, it helps very little to understand American 
corporate law by studying the law of American states if 60% of American corporations choose to 
incorporate in foreign nations. Even now, lawyers advising hedge fund managers based in the United 
States would practically be committing malpractice if they were unfamiliar with the laws of the Cayman 
Islands—the jurisdiction estimated to be home to upwards of 60% of the world’s hedge fund assets. See 
Jan Fichtner, The Anatomy of the Cayman Islands Offshore Financial Center: Anglo-America, Japan, 
and the Role of Hedge Funds, 23 REV. INT’L POL. ECON. 1034, 1051 (2016). 
 34 See, e.g., Marcus Cole, “Delaware Is Not a State”: Are We Witnessing Jurisdictional Competition 
in Bankruptcy?, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1845, 1847 (2002) (“[T]he advantages most often postulated for 
Delaware’s dominance in corporate law do not carry over to corporate bankruptcy.”); Richard L. Revesz, 
Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the “Race-to-the-Bottom” Rationale for Federal 
Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1210, 1247 (1992) (drawing on the corporate charter 
competition literature to challenge “race-to-the-bottom arguments in the environmental context”); Robert 
H. Sitkoff & Max Schanzenbach, Jurisdictional Competition for Trust Funds: An Empirical Analysis of 
Perpetuities and Taxes, 115 YALE L.J. 356, 363 (2005) (discussing the nature of jurisdictional 
competition in the trust law context by engaging with the corporate charter competition literature). These 
areas of the law are heavily influenced by jurisdictional competition theories, recognizing that rules are 
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The remainder of this Article is organized in three Parts. Part I 
synthesizes existing accounts and proposes a revision to the standard 
interstate competition framework underlying the study of American 
corporate law. Specifically, it develops a theoretical framework accounting 
for the emerging international market for corporate law. Part II details the 
corporate lawmaking processes in offshore corporate law havens, which are 
severely understudied thus far.35 This includes (1) data showing the extent to 
which lawmakers in these jurisdictions are “captured” by foreign 
corporations36 by being heavily reliant on annual incorporation fees for 
government revenue; (2) the inner workings of offshore law firms and other 
local interest groups that facilitate efficient production of corporate law; and 
(3) the emergence of specialized business courts featuring credentialed 
business law jurists that resolve disputes swiftly (and in many cases, 
secretly). Part III surveys important features of offshore corporate law, 
highlighting how offshore corporate law havens enable corporations to opt 
out of corporate governance rules that are largely immutable under Delaware 
law. Part III also weighs the potential benefits offered by an emergence of 
international competition against important negative externalities—effects 
on third parties—present in the international setting. A short Conclusion 
follows. 
 
supplied in part through multiple lawmakers competing to supply their laws to private actors. See, e.g., 
Daniel Klerman, Jurisdictional Competition and the Evolution of the Common Law, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1179, 1182–83 (2007) (“Just as state revenue from incorporation fees may encourage states to mold 
corporate law to attract more corporations, this Article suggests that revenue from court fees encouraged 
English courts to mold the common law to attract more cases.”). Leading thinkers typically agree that the 
law is derived from or heavily influenced by jurisdictional competition, but vigorously disagree as to 
whether the competition is normatively desirable. See Kahan & Kamar, Myth, supra note 28, at 681–85. 
 35 See Robert Briant, Transactional Success Offshore? The Role of Corporate Lawyers, BUS. BVI 
62, 63 (2015) (anecdotally describing the corporate lawmaking processes in offshore jurisdictions but 
lamenting that “there are no studies or journal articles to cite as evidence of this practice”). 
 36 I use the term “capture” to refer to special interest groups exerting significant influence over the 
local lawmaking process. See, e.g., Ernesto Dal Bó, Regulatory Capture: A Review, 22 OXFORD REV. 
ECON. POL’Y 203, 203 (2006) (“According to the broad interpretation, regulatory capture is the process 
through which special interests affect state intervention in any of its forms, which can include areas as 
diverse as the setting of taxes, the choice of foreign or monetary policy, or the legislation affecting 
R&D.”). In their strongest form, interest groups can literally write legislation that “captured” lawmakers 
formally enact into law. For excellent discussions analyzing Delaware corporate law in the framework of 
a capture model, see William W. Bratton, Delaware Law as Applied Public Choice Theory: Bill Cary and 
the Basic Course After Twenty-Five Years, 34 GA. L. REV. 447, 453–61 (2000), and William W. Bratton 
& Joseph A. McCahery, Regulatory Competition, Regulatory Capture, and Corporate Self-Regulation, 
73 N.C. L. REV. 1861 (1995). 
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I. (NATION) STATES AS LABORATORIES OF CORPORATE LAW 
This Part sketches the standard account underlying American corporate 
law scholarship and develops a theoretical framework for understanding the 
emerging international market for corporate law. Section A synthesizes the 
prevailing literature that identifies states as potential competitors in the race 
to supply corporate charters. Section B documents recent federal and state 
court jurisprudence that effectively enables firms to choose the corporate law 
of foreign nations without establishing any physical operations in the chosen 
jurisdiction. Section B also advances this Article’s central thesis: that 
Delaware and other states compete with foreign nations in the increasingly 
globalized market for corporate law. 
A. The Standard Account: States as Laboratories of Corporate Law 
American corporate law is often characterized as a byproduct of a race: 
states compete to supply corporate law.37 For the most part, corporate law is 
a collection of default rules governing the relations between the firm’s 
shareholders (principals) and the managers (agents).38 These rules serve to 
remedy the various agency problems that arise when a large group of 
individuals pool money and labor for business ventures. In the United States, 
corporate law has historically been the domain of state law, although the 
federal government sets minimum standards through statutes and 
administrative guidelines.39 
The traditional view holds that states compete to supply corporate 
charters in order to attract annual fees from locally incorporated 
corporations. Enacting the first modern liberal corporate statute in 1896, 
New Jersey was the early market leader, principally drawing corporations 
physically headquartered in New York.40 But when New Jersey enacted a 
series of restrictive amendments to its statutes deemed unfriendly for 
businesses in 1913, Delaware quickly took over New Jersey’s throne.41 
 
 37 See Roberta Romano, Law as a Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle, 1 J.L. ECON. 
& ORG. 225, 226–27 (1985) [hereinafter Romano, Law as a Product]. 
 38 See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1416, 
1416 (1989) [hereinafter Easterbrook & Fischel, The Corporate Contract] (explaining that corporate law 
“establishes minimum voting rules and restricts how managers can treat the firm and the investors”). 
 39 See Bebchuk, Desirable Limits, supra note 5, at 1442. 
 40 See Frederick Tung, Before Competition: Origins of the Internal Affairs Doctrine, 32 J. CORP. L. 
33, 81, 92–94 (2006). 
 41 See Joel Seligman, A Brief History of Delaware’s General Corporation Law of 1899, 1 DEL. J. 
CORP. L. 249, 270–71 (1976). 
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Delaware has since maintained an almost monopolistic advantage over other 
states.42 
The view that this competition produces socially undesirable results is 
most famously associated with former Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) chair William Cary.43 Professor Cary argued in a widely cited piece 
published in 1974 that competition between states to supply corporate 
charters induced states to “race for the bottom” by adopting laws that favor 
corporate insiders—namely directors and officers—over dispersed 
shareholders.44 
Professor Cary’s thesis was attacked almost immediately, despite 
enjoying a brief period of scholarly consensus.45 Judge Ralph Winter set the 
table for this takeover.46 Judge Winter suggested that any competition 
between states would result in a race for the top, because the market would 
constrain managers from incorporating in a state that would be detrimental 
to the shareholders’ interest.47 While managers could technically choose any 
state’s corporate law, if that choice was unfavorable to the shareholders’ 
interest, they would be outperformed, putting the managers’ employment in 
jeopardy. Building on Judge Winter’s thesis, Professor Roberta Romano’s 
wide-ranging theoretical and empirical studies have produced a generation 
of followers who maintain that the race is for the top.48 In doing so, Judge 
 
 42 See William J. Carney & George B. Shepherd, The Mystery of Delaware Law’s Continuing 
Success, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 2; Omari Scott Simmons, Branding the Small Wonder: Delaware’s 
Dominance and the Market for Corporate Law, 42 U. RICH. L. REV. 1129, 1131 (2008); David A. Skeel, 
Icarus and American Corporate Regulation, 61 BUS. LAW. 155, 165 (2005) (calling Delaware “the most 
important corporate law regulator since 1913”). 
 43 See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Toward an Interest-Group Theory of Delaware 
Corporate Law, 65 TEX. L. REV. 469, 474 (1987) (“The race-to-the-bottom theory was presented most 
forcefully in Professor William Cary’s famous article that gave rise to that phrase.”). 
 44 See William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 
663, 705 (1974). This view built on Justice Brandeis’s concern that a competition between states to 
produce laws for corporations would induce state laws to capitulate to private corporate interests over 
public interests. See Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 548–65 (1933) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
 45 See Ralph K. Winter, Foreword to ROMANO, GENIUS, supra note 2, at ix (1993) (“Twenty years 
ago, legal scholars were herdlike in regarding corporate law as a species of consumer protection in which 
the law’s role was to protect helpless investors by hogtying a predatory corporate management.”). 
 46 Winter was a former Yale Law School professor and Senior Judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Second Circuit. Ralph K. Winter, U.S. CT. APPEALS FOR SECOND CIR., 
http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/judges/bios/rkw.html [https://perma.cc/75NH-CGAK]. 
 47 See Winter, State Law, supra note 5, at 256. 
 48 Cf. Michael Klausner, Corporations, Corporate Law, and Networks of Contracts, 81 VA. L. REV. 
757, 770 (1995) [hereinafter Klausner, Corporations] (“[T]here is a broad consensus that the finish line 
of the race is closer to the top than the bottom.”). The “race for the top” account probably gained so much 
following in no small part because of the ascendance of economics in the study of the law during the 
1970s and the 1980s. This movement, in corporate law, successfully took down the notion that corporate 
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Winter and Professor Romano successfully reshaped the dominant narrative 
in corporate law: competition between states leads to efficient production of 
corporate law while incentivizing socially beneficial corporate law 
innovations. This view is probably the mainstream view among modern 
corporate law circles, although the race for the bottom thesis continues to 
enjoy support, in various iterations.49 
The idea that competition even exists between states has been subject 
to sweeping revisionist accounts within the past two decades.50 Professors 
Marcel Kahan and Ehud Kamar, for instance, have argued that the 
competition metaphor is largely a “myth,” observing that “[o]ther than 
Delaware, no state is engaged in significant efforts to attract incorporations 
of public companies.”51 Specifically, Professors Kahan and Kamar showed 
that no other state structures its corporate charter fees to attract publicly 
traded companies.52 
 
law was a sovereign-based law and replaced it with economic theories suggesting that corporate law 
constituted private contracts, amendable to private choice. Thus, corporate law today is predominantly 
conceptualized as a nexus of standard form contracts, rather than a set of rules imposed by the state. See, 
e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, The Corporate Contract, supra note 38, at 1426 (referring to a corporation 
as a “nexus of contracts”). 
 49 See, e.g., Lucian Bebchuk et al., Does the Evidence Favor State Competition in Corporate Law?, 
90 CALIF. L. REV. 1775 (2002) (finding that state competition over corporate charters provides 
undesirable incentives that substantially affect corporate managers’ private interests); Lucian Arye 
Bebchuk & Allen Ferrell, Federalism and Corporate Law: The Race to Protect Managers from 
Takeovers, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1168 (1999) (discussing the incentives states have to produce rules that 
excessively protect incumbent managers and restrict hostile takeovers, often leading to rules that do not 
maximize shareholder value); Guhan Subramanian, The Influence of Antitakeover Statutes on 
Incorporation Choice: Evidence on the “Race” Debate and Antitakeover Overreaching, 150 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1795 (2002) (finding that managers generally migrate to typical antitakeover statutes, which 
increase managerial agency costs and reduce shareholder wealth, consistent with the “race to the bottom” 
view). 
 50 Most of this debate is framed around competition for publicly traded corporations. Professor Ian 
Ayres has observed that given the insignificance of close corporations for state revenues, there might not 
be a race in the interstate context. See Ian Ayres, Judging Close Corporations in the Age of Statutes, 
70 WASH. U. L.Q. 365, 370 (1992). In a recent empirical study, Professors Bruce Kobayashi and Larry 
Ribstein argued that Delaware is also the market leader for close companies. See Bruce H. Kobayashi & 
Larry E. Ribstein, Delaware for Small Fry: Jurisdictional Competition for Limited Liability Companies, 
2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 91, 91 (“[W]e find evidence that large LLCs, like large corporations, tend to form 
in Delaware, and that they do so for many of the same reasons—that is, for the quality of Delaware’s 
legal system.”). 
 51 Kahan & Kamar, Myth, supra note 28, at 684. 
 52 Id. at 687–88. Others, most notably Professors Lucian Bebchuk and Assaf Hamdani, have called 
the race a “leisurely walk,” observing that “other states have not been making any visible efforts to mount 
a serious challenge to Delaware’s dominance.” Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, Vigorous Race 
or Leisurely Walk: Reconsidering the Competition over Corporate Charters, 112 YALE L.J. 553, 556 
(2002) [hereinafter Bebchuk & Hamdani, Leisurely Walk]. Professors Bebchuk and Hamdani attribute 
Delaware’s preeminence in corporate law, instead, to network externalities. Id. at 559. The concept of 
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Other challengers to the traditional state competition theory identify the 
federal government in Washington D.C. as Delaware’s real competition. 
Professor Mark Roe developed this argument in a series of law review 
articles starting in 2003.53 His argument is two-fold. First, Congress and the 
SEC already have important pieces of corporate governance rules on the 
books that displace certain segments of state corporate law.54 Thus, for 
instance, the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 sets the minimum 
standards for proxy rules,55 and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 mandates 
“internal managerial duties and allocates authority inside the firm.”56 
Second, because federal authorities can always preempt state corporate law 
under modern interpretations of the Commerce Clause, Delaware’s corporate 
governance rules reflect “corporate law that the federal players tolerate.”57 
Many legal scholars now view the federal government as a significant 
 
network externalities refers to the benefits of incorporating in a jurisdiction where a large number of other 
firms have incorporated. See Klausner, Corporations, supra note 48, at 843–45. These benefits include 
(1) a robust body of case law enhancing the predictability of the law; and (2) a large group of lawyers 
who can efficiently provide legal services by the virtue of their extensive practice experience in one 
jurisdiction. Bebchuk & Hamdani, Leisurely Walk, supra, at 586–87. Network externalities help explain 
why Delaware has maintained a near monopolistic advantage in the corporate law world, even though 
other states could easily copy and paste Delaware’s substantive law. Importantly, Delaware’s corporate 
law statutes are typically written in open-ended language, all but guaranteeing a steady flow of cases. See 
id. at 601. 
 53 See, e.g., Roe, Delaware’s Competition, supra note 5; Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Politics, 
118 HARV. L. REV. 2491 (2005); Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Shrinking Half-Life, 62 STAN. L. REV. 125 
(2009). 
 54 Mark J. Roe, Delaware and Washington as Corporate Lawmakers, 34 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 10 
(2009) [hereinafter Roe, Delaware and Washington] (“Washington makes corporate law . . . . It has made 
the main rules governing insider trading, stock buybacks, how institutional investors can interact in 
corporate governance, the structure of key board committees, board composition (how independent some 
board members must be), how far states could go in making merger law, how attentive institutional 
investors must be in voting their proxies, what business issues and transactional information public firms 
must disclose (which often affect the structure and duties of insiders and managers to shareholders in a 
myriad of transactions), the rules on dual class common stock recapitalizations, and duties and liabilities 
of gatekeepers like accountants and lawyers, and more.”). 
 55 See Bebchuk, Desirable Limits, supra note 5, at 1442 (“Federal law was totally silent on the 
internal governance of corporations until the enactment of the Securities Act of 1933.”). 
 56 Roe, Delaware’s Competition, supra note 5, at 598; see also id. at 633–34 (“Sarbanes-Oxley 
mandates that the SEC make rules for audit committee independence. It controls executive compensation 
by requiring that a class of bonuses be forfeited back to the company. It requires that the board’s audit 
committee, not management, control the hiring and firing of accountants, as well as the ancillary business 
that accountants do with the corporation. It mandates that audit partners rotate and pushes firms toward 
rotating their accountants. It orders the SEC to grab control of off-balance-sheet transactions and special 
purpose vehicles. It increases federal control over who may and may not sit on a corporate board. These 
matters were once for state law. Not anymore.” (footnotes omitted)).  
 57 Id. at 644. 
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contributor to American corporate law, principally by constraining 
Delaware.58 
While these studies should be celebrated for complicating and refining 
the study of American corporate law, they too tell an incomplete story. This 
is because Delaware competes not just with its fellow states (and maybe the 
federal government), but increasingly faces competition from foreign 
nations. The absence of foreign nations in the prevailing account is 
particularly notable if the market for corporate law is segmented: that is, 
corporations might not only be looking to one leading jurisdiction producing 
the “best” corporate law, but may also have an appetite for differentiated 
corporate law “products.”59 That is, even if Delaware continues to dominate 
the market, there may be a significant number of firms looking for corporate 
governance regimes that substantially deviate from that of Delaware. Thus, 
no systematic study of American corporate law can be complete without 
considering foreign nations that supply corporate law to “American” 
corporations. The next Section develops a theoretical framework 
conceptualizing foreign nations as Delaware’s emerging competition in the 
increasingly globalized market for corporate law. 
B. Nations as Laboratories of Corporate Law 
Under the standard account of American corporate law, states alone 
compete to supply corporate charters. This Article complicates the literature 
by introducing foreign nations as emerging suppliers in the race. 
To be clear, this is not the first time someone has written about 
competition between nations to supply corporate law. For instance, there is 
a growing body of literature acknowledging possible competition between 
European nations, in part enabled by recent jurisprudence from the European 
Court of Justice.60 
 
 58 See William B. Chandler III & Leo E. Strine, Jr., The New Federalism of the American Corporate 
Governance System: Preliminary Reflections of Two Residents of One Small State, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 
953, 958 (2003). 
 59 Professor Michal Barzuza, drawing on Professor Michael Porter’s influential work on competitive 
strategy, argued that the corporate law market may be explained by jurisdictions “dividing the market to 
serve distinct consumer groups with similar demand preferences.” Barzuza, supra note 29, at 942 n.15 
(citing MICHAEL E. PORTER, COMPETITIVE STRATEGY: TECHNIQUES FOR ANALYZING INDUSTRIES AND 
COMPETITORS 196–200 (1980)). Judge Richard Posner and Professor Kenneth Scott advanced an earlier 
version of the “market segmentation” thesis in 1980, hypothesizing that states differentiate their corporate 
law products. See RICHARD A. POSNER & KENNETH E. SCOTT, ECONOMICS OF CORPORATION LAW AND 
SECURITIES REGULATION 111 (1980). 
 60 See, e.g., Jens C. Dammann, Freedom of Choice in European Corporate Law, 29 YALE J. INT’L 
L. 477, 480–81 (2004) (arguing that the European Community should adopt free choice in corporate law); 
Martin Gelter, Centros and Defensive Regulatory Competition: Some Thoughts and a Glimpse at the 
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Legal scholars have also occasionally acknowledged the alarming rates 
at which American corporations are reincorporating in foreign “tax 
havens.”61 But prior discussions have almost exclusively centered around the 
corporate inversion movement: American companies like Accenture 
Consulting or Chiquita Bananas reincorporating in notorious “tax havens” to 
reduce domestic tax liability. This line of scholarship tends to highlight the 
problematic aspects of U.S. tax rules being bundled with corporate 
governance rules, incentivizing domestic firms to choose “inferior” 
corporate governance rules in order to receive tax benefits in offshore 
havens.62 For example, Professors Mitchell Kane and Ed Rock describe 
corporate inversions as “unabashedly all about tax reduction.”63 Professors 
Kane and Rock warn that “tax-motivated corporate locational decisions can 
lead to an efficiency cost to the extent that corporations are steered into 
suboptimal legal regimes from a corporate law standpoint.”64 
In a more recent piece, Professor Eric Talley argues that foreign 
incorporation introduces material legal risks, “since they move the locus of 
corporate internal affairs out of conventional jurisprudential terrain and into 
the domain of a foreign jurisdiction whose law is—by comparison—
recondite and unfamiliar.”65 Unsurprisingly, Professor Talley assesses that 
“a strong domestic corporate governance regime can provide a plausible 
buffer against a tax-induced incorporation exodus.”66 
 
Data, 20 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 467 (2019) (providing a partial theoretical and empirical analysis of 
defensive regulatory competition); Martin Gelter, The Structure of Regulatory Competition in European 
Corporate Law, 5 J. CORP. L. STUD. 247 (2005) (analyzing the structural conditions of competition on 
the supply and demand sides of the market for European corporate law); Andrea Zorzi, A European 
Nevada? Bad Enforcement as an Edge in State Competition for Incorporations, 18 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. 
REV. 251 (2017) (stating that the possibility of one European state competing for a segment of the market 
for incorporations cannot be ruled out). The European model of corporate law governance has also long 
been on the radar of American corporate law scholars from a comparative law standpoint. See, e.g., 
ROMANO, GENIUS, supra note 2, at 128–40; Bebchuk, Desirable Limits, supra note 5, at 1439. 
 61 See, e.g., Omri Marian, Home-Country Effects of Corporate Inversions, 90 WASH. L. REV. 1, 7–8 
(2015). 
 62 See Fleischer, supra note 17, at 276 (“In some circumstances, managers will opt to minimize taxes 
by choosing a tax haven or tax-friendly jurisdiction, even if that jurisdiction is suboptimal from the 
standpoint of corporate law.”). 
 63 Kane & Rock, supra note 18, at 1230. 
 64 Id. at 1233. 
 65 See, e.g., Talley, supra note 12, at 1652. 
 66 Id. In a similar vein, Professor Omari Scott Simmons observed in an excellent piece that 
Delaware’s preeminence is intertwined with America’s global strength, identifying “capital migration 
toward foreign markets, the growing appeal of foreign stock exchanges, multi-jurisdictional litigation, 
business firms eschewing courts for alternative dispute resolution, and corporate tax-inversion strategies” 
as potential global threats. Omari Scott Simmons, Delaware’s Global Threat, 41 J. CORP. L. 217, 217 
(2015). On the other side of the spectrum, a few scholars have pointed to offshore jurisdictions as offering 
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Because the prevailing view considers tax to be the only driver of 
foreign incorporation, the existing literature is devoid of a serious inquiry 
into the substantive corporate governance laws of foreign nations. While 
appreciating insights from this current body of scholarship, this Article 
analyzes the viability of foreign nations competing with Delaware from a 
corporate governance perspective. This conversation is increasingly relevant 
as foreign nations continue to grow their market share of “American” 
corporations. 
The following discussion documents recent domestic jurisprudence that 
sets the stage for an international market for the supply of corporate law. 
1. The Internal Affairs Doctrine Goes International 
In the United States, a small state like Delaware can dominate the 
corporate law market because of the widespread acceptance of the internal 
affairs doctrine.67 The internal affairs doctrine is a conflict of laws 
principle—a set of state law rules principally developed by judges in the 
nineteenth century.68 The doctrine enables corporations to opt into any state’s 
corporate law simply by incorporating in that state.69 Thus, the extent to 
which foreign corporate law can successfully govern the “internal affairs” of 
American companies—which in turn determines a range of issues including 
 
innovative financial instruments. See CHRISTOPHER M. BRUNER, RE-IMAGINING OFFSHORE FINANCE: 
MARKET DOMINANT SMALL JURISDICTIONS IN A GLOBALIZING FINANCIAL WORLD 59–60 (2016) 
(highlighting Bermuda’s success in the insurance industry); Anna Manasco Dionne & Jonathan R. Macey, 
Offshore Finance and Onshore Markets: Racing to the Bottom, or Moving Toward Efficient?, in 
OFFSHORE FINANCIAL CENTERS AND REGULATORY COMPETITION 8, 8–10 (Andrew P. Morriss ed., 
2010). While this line of scholarship draws on the domestic corporate charter competition literature to 
make normative claims about the desirability of offshore financial products, it does not recognize offshore 
jurisdictions as competing with American states to supply corporate law for publicly traded corporations. 
 67 Deborah A. DeMott, Perspectives on Choice of Law for Corporate Internal Affairs, 48 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 161, 161 (1985) (“To many corporate lawyers, the ‘internal affairs’ doctrine . . . is 
irresistible if not logically inevitable.”). 
 68 See Tung, supra note 40, at 57–58. According to the U.S. Supreme Court, the internal affairs 
doctrine “is a conflict of laws principle which recognizes that only one State should have the authority to 
regulate a corporation’s internal affairs—matters peculiar to the relationships among or between the 
corporation and its current officers, directors, and shareholders.” Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 
645 (1982). To conflict of laws junkies, the internal affairs doctrine is an unusual doctrine, departing from 
the standard prescription that instructs courts to weigh multiple factors in order to determine the “correct” 
law applicable to a dispute involving more than one jurisdiction. See LEA BRILMAYER ET AL., CONFLICT 
OF LAWS: CASES AND MATERIALS 114–17, 177–85 (2015); Kent Greenfield, Democracy and the 
Dominance of Delaware in Corporate Law, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 135, 144 (2004) (“I believe the 
internal affairs doctrine is open to serious challenge. I believe it is best seen as simply an exception to 
conflict-of-laws rules . . . .”). 
 69 See Tung, supra note 40, at 45–46. 
 
114:1403 (2020) Delaware’s New Competition 
1419 
derivative suits, fiduciary duties, and shareholder inspector rights70—relies 
not just on foreign nations offering desirable sets of corporate governance 
rules, or even companies choosing to incorporate in those jurisdictions. It 
relies on domestic law honoring those choices. 
Today, the internal affairs doctrine has a near-impeccable pedigree 
among judges in the United States.71 The Restatement (Second) of Conflict 
of Laws, which has been highly influential in federal and state courts,72 
prescribes the application of “local law of the state of incorporation” for 
issues related to the internal affairs of corporations, except in unusual cases.73 
However, one cannot assume that the internal affairs doctrine 
automatically extends to corporations incorporated in foreign nations. First, 
the Restatement specifically crafts guidelines for American “states,”74 
remaining silent on what judges ought to do in inter-national cases. Second, 
the internal affairs doctrine is said to have a “quasi-constitutional” status,75 
operating under a few cryptic clues from the U.S. Supreme Court.76 Given 
 
 70 See Vincent S.J. Buccola, Opportunism and Internal Affairs, 93 TUL. L. REV. 339, 339 (2018) 
(“The internal affairs doctrine is the sine qua non of modern corporate law.”). Of course, whether a 
particular matter falls under the domain of the “internal affairs” of a corporation is not entirely 
straightforward. See James J. Park, Reassessing the Distinction Between Corporate and Securities Law, 
64 UCLA L. REV. 116, 131–32 (2017). 
 71 This need not be the rule, as a considerable number of foreign nations subscribe to the “real seat” 
approach to corporate law, assigning corporate governance rules based on where the corporation 
principally conducts its business. See Werner F. Ebke, The “Real Seat” Doctrine in the Conflict of 
Corporate Laws, 36 INT’L LAW. 1015, 1016 (2002) (“[T]he real seat doctrine . . . gives effect to the law 
of the state that has the most significant relationship to a corporation.”). 
 72 Thus, for instance, in NatTel, LLC v. SAC Capital Advisors LLC, the Second Circuit referred to 
the Connecticut choice of law rule that “the state of incorporation normally determines issues relating to 
the internal affairs of a corporation,” while noting that the rule is “consistent with provisions in the 
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws.” 370 F. App’x 132, 134 (2d Cir. 2006). 
 73 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 309 (AM. LAW INST. 1971). 
 74 See id. (referring to the “local law of the state of incorporation” (emphasis added)). 
 75 Compare Richard M. Buxbaum, Federalism and Company Law, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1163, 1166 
(1984) (questioning the internal affairs doctrine’s constitutional pedigree), with Paul N. Cox, The 
Constitutional “Dynamics” of the Internal Affairs Rule—A Comment on CTS Corporation, 13 J. CORP. 
L. 317, 349 (1988) (“[T]he internal affairs rule of choice of law may have a constitutional dimension.”). 
 76 Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 641–42 (1982) (“[I]n this case, MITE Corp., the tender 
offeror, is a Delaware corporation with principal offices in Connecticut. Chicago Rivet is a publicly held 
Illinois corporation with shareholders scattered around the country, 27% of whom live in Illinois. MITE’s 
offer to Chicago Rivet’s shareholders, including those in Illinois, necessarily employed interstate facilities 
in communicating its offer, which, if accepted, would result in transactions occurring across state 
lines . . . . It is therefore apparent that the Illinois statute is a direct restraint on interstate commerce and 
that it has a sweeping extraterritorial effect.”). The Delaware Supreme Court has taken a step further, 
pronouncing that the internal affairs doctrine may be constitutionally required “under due process, the 
commerce clause and the full faith and credit clause—so that the law of one state governs the relationships 
of a corporation to its stockholders, directors and officers in matters of internal corporate governance.” 
McDermott, Inc. v. Lewis, 531 A.2d 206, 216 (Del. 1987). 
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that many of these constitutional doctrines have developed in a purely 
domestic context or are plainly inapplicable for the international setting,77 it 
is unclear if constitutional law adds much guidance. It may be for this reason 
that Judge Frank Easterbrook, one of the preeminent authorities in American 
corporate law, pronounced in 2009 that “this country does not recognize an 
internal-affairs doctrine in its dealings with other nations.”78 
Putting aside the question of whether courts ought to extend the internal 
affairs doctrine internationally, a survey of domestic jurisprudential trends 
reveals that courts across the United States have already extended the 
internal affairs doctrine for American business entities incorporated in 
foreign nations. Indeed, federal and state courts across jurisdictions, 
including California,79 Connecticut,80 Delaware,81 Illinois,82 Maryland,83 
Minnesota,84 New York,85 New Jersey,86 Texas,87 and the District of 
 
 77 For example, the Full Faith and Credit Clause addresses the duties that states have to respect the 
“public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State.” U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (emphasis 
added). 
 78 Easterbrook, Race for the Bottom, supra note 10, at 698. 
 79 See, e.g., Vaughn v. LJ Int’l, Inc., 94 Cal. Rptr. 3d 166, 168 (Ct. App. 2009) (applying British 
Virgin Islands law for “a fine jewelry company incorporated in the British Virgin Islands, [which] has no 
other connection to that jurisdiction”). 
 80 See, e.g., NatTel, LLC v. SAC Capital Advisors, 370 Fed. App’x 132, 133 (2d Cir. 2006) (applying 
Bahamas law for shareholder’s lawsuit involving an entity formed in the Bahamas). 
 81 See, e.g., Kostolany v. Davis, No. 13299, 1995 WL 662683, at *2 (Del. Ch. Nov. 7, 1995) 
(applying Dutch law after reasoning that legal relations between “a corporation and its stockholders, 
directors, and officers are governed by the law of the state of incorporation”). 
 82 See, e.g., Pittway Corp. v. United States, 88 F.3d 501, 503 (7th Cir. 1996) (“On this issue of 
internal corporate affairs, we look not to the law of any of the United States but to the law of France[,] a 
State in the international sense.”). 
 83 See, e.g., Tomran, Inc. v. Passano, 891 A.2d 336, 342 (Md. 2006) (“[U]nder the internal affairs 
doctrine, an analysis of Irish law determines whether Tomran possesses a right to bring a derivative 
suit . . . .”). 
 84 See, e.g., Varga v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 952 F. Supp. 2d 850, 855 (D. Minn. 2013) (“The Palm 
Beach Funds were formed in the Cayman Islands and, hence, whatever duties they were owed must have 
arisen under Cayman Islands law.”), aff’d, 764 F.3d 833 (8th Cir. 2014). 
 85 See, e.g., In re Kingate Mgmt. Ltd. Litig., No. 09-CV-5386 (DAB), 2016 WL 5339538, at *15 
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 21, 2016) (“The fact that Madoff and his fraudulent scheme arose out of New York is 
not sufficient to override BVI’s interests in regulating the relationship between BVI corporations and 
their shareholders.”). 
 86 See, e.g., Krys v. Aaron, 106 F. Supp. 3d 472, 479 (D.N.J. 2015) (applying “Cayman law in 
accordance with the internal affairs doctrine”). 
 87 See, e.g., In re BP S’holder Derivative Litig., No. 10-md-2185, 2011 WL 4345209, at *15 (S.D. 
Tex. Sept. 15, 2011) (“The primary concern of this derivative litigation is the internal affairs of an English 
corporation, and the suit seeks to recover damages for the benefit of BP only. Accordingly, England has 
a greater interest in the resolution of this dispute.” (emphasis omitted)). 
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Columbia,88 have recently extended the internal affairs doctrine for business 
entities incorporated in foreign nations.89 
Courts frequently apply precedent developed in the interstate context 
without distinguishing between states and foreign nations. For instance, in 
Howe v. Bank of New York Mellon, the Southern District of New York 
concluded that it “must apply Cayman Islands law to the question of 
derivative standing” given that the defendant “is an entity incorporated under 
the laws of the Cayman Islands.”90 In other cases, courts have expressly held 
that the internal affairs doctrine applies outside of the United States. For 
instance, in City of Harper Woods Employees’ Retirement System v. Olver, 
the D.C. Circuit applied English law to a company incorporated in England, 
holding that the “internal affairs doctrine applies to corporations 
incorporated outside of the United States.”91 
To be sure, this is not a universal rule. A number of federal and state 
judges have declined to apply the internal affairs doctrine in international 
cases on the grounds that there was an insufficient nexus between the 
corporation’s physical operations and the place of incorporation. For 
instance, in UBS Securities LLC v. Highland Capital Management, L.P., a 
New York state trial court applied New York law in an internal affairs case 
involving a Cayman Islands corporation because “[o]ther than being 
incorporated in the Cayman Islands, [the corporation] has no obvious ties to 
that jurisdiction.”92 In another case, Judge Scheindlin of the Southern District 
 
 88 See, e.g., City of Harper Woods Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. Olver, 577 F. Supp. 2d 124, 129 (D.D.C. 2008) 
(“The internal affairs doctrine is not limited to the application of the laws of the States of the United 
States . . . . Based on the internal affairs doctrine, BAE plc, incorporated in the U.K., is subject to U.K. 
law.”), aff’d, 589 F.3d 1292 (D.C. Cir. 2009). 
 89 Not all opinions automatically deduce applicable corporate law from the corporate entity’s place 
of incorporation. In some cases, the place of incorporation is just one factor in a judge’s choice of law 
analysis. For instance, noting that the internal affairs doctrine may be excused in “unusual cases,” a 
federal judge in New Jersey in Krys v. Aaron employed New Jersey’s general choice of law analysis 
weighing “(1) the interests of interstate comity, (2) the interests of the parties, (3) the interests underlying 
the field of tort law, (4) the interests of judicial administration, and (5) the competing interests of the 
states.” 106 F. Supp. 3d at 485. Even so, the court concluded that the law of the place of incorporation 
(Cayman Islands law) controlled, in part because “the parties will necessarily benefit from the application 
of a single standard.” Id. 
 90 783 F. Supp. 2d 466, 475 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
 91 589 F.3d 1292, 1298 (D.C. Cir. 2009). 
 92 2011 WL 781481, at *3 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 1, 2011), aff’d in part, modified in part, 940 N.Y.S.2d 
74 (App. Div. 2012). But given that New York as a state has not adopted that policy (other New York 
cases extend the doctrine internationally), this should be treated more like an exception. See, e.g., NatTel, 
LLC v. SAC Capital Advisors, LLC, 370 F. App’x 132, 133 (2d Cir. 2006) (affirming the district court 
finding that “the law of the Bahamas—where ODC was incorporated—governed [the] dispute because 
NatTel’s claims involved matters of internal corporate governance”). 
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of New York refused to apply British Virgin Islands law for suits brought by 
investors against British Virgin Islands hedge funds, reasoning in part that 
the “allegedly tortious conduct . . . in relation to the management of the 
Funds had little more than a nominal connection to the BVI.”93 This line of 
cases derives from the concept of “pseudo-foreign” corporations, or business 
entities that have no physical presence in the state of incorporation other than 
the fact of incorporation.94 
For better or worse, the “pseudo-foreign” corporations exception 
surfaces from time to time in the domestic interstate context95 without 
detracting from the apparent robustness of the interstate charter competition 
market. While judges may be more hesitant to extend the internal affairs 
doctrine to corporations incorporated in foreign nations,96 the doctrine has 
been extended enough to enable foreign nations to effectively compete with 
Delaware for corporate charters. 
 
 93 Pension Comm. of Univ. of Montreal Pension Plan v. Banc of Am. Sec., LLC, 446 F. Supp. 2d 
163, 194 (S.D.N.Y. 2006); see also Tech. Dev. Co. v. Onischenko, No. 05-4282 (MLC), 2011 WL 
6779552, at *11 (D.N.J. Dec. 23, 2011) (“We further note that the section 6 factors may not favor 
application of Bermuda law, insofar as that jurisdiction has little connection to this claim with the 
exception of TTDC being incorporated there and TTDC having a bank account there.”). 
 94 See Summer Kim, Corporate Long Arms, 50 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1067, 1083–84 (2018) (“[The pseudo-
foreign corporation] exception provides that if a corporation is chartered in one place but does all of its 
activities and business in another place (the host state), then the host state’s laws will apply to the internal 
affairs of the corporation.”); Elvin R. Latty, Pseudo-Foreign Corporations, 65 YALE L.J. 137, 144–45 
(1955). Even the Restatement of Conflict of Laws recognizes that there may be unusual cases where the 
law of a state that is not the state of incorporation may govern, if that state has a more significant 
relationship to the corporation. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 309 (AM. LAW 
INST. 1971) (“The local law of the state of incorporation will be applied to determine the existence and 
extent of a director’s or officer’s liability to the corporation, its creditors and shareholders, except where, 
with respect to the particular issue, some other state has a more significant relationship . . . .”); Kostolany 
v. Davis, 1995 WL 662683, at *2 (Del. Ch. Nov. 7, 1995) (explaining that the law of the state of 
incorporation may not apply in an “extremely rare” situation where the “overriding interest of another 
state” requires a contrary result). 
 95 Most noteworthily, California has enacted a statutory exception to the internal affairs doctrine, 
mandating the application of California law for corporations that conduct the majority of their business 
in California, without regard to the corporations’ place of incorporation. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 2115 
(West 2010); see also Matt Stevens, Note, Internal Affairs Doctrine: California Versus Delaware in a 
Fight for the Right to Regulate Foreign Corporations, 48 B.C. L. REV. 1047, 1047 (2007) (“The Internal 
Affairs Doctrine (‘IAD’) has traditionally been a categorical rule mandating that in corporate conflict-of-
laws scenarios, only the incorporating state has the right to regulate a corporation’s internal affairs. 
California has created a statutory exception to the IAD, however, that allows regulation of the internal 
affairs of out-of-state corporations in limited circumstances.”). 
 96 See, e.g., UBS Sec. LLC v. Highland Capital Mgmt., L.P., No. 650097/2009, 2011 WL 781481, 
at *3 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 1, 2011) (“Application of the law of New York is also mandated on the ground 
that SOHC has almost no ties to the Cayman Islands. . . . Other than being incorporated in the Cayman 
Islands, SOHC has no obvious ties to that jurisdiction.”), aff’d in part, modified in part, 940 N.Y.S.2d 74 
(App. Div. 2012). 
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II. EVIDENCE OF MORE PLAYERS IN THE RACE: THE MAKING OF 
OFFSHORE CORPORATE LAW HAVENS 
This Part describes the extent to which foreign nations are starting to 
compete with Delaware to supply corporate charters. Because of their 
prominence in this general trend, this study primarily focuses on three 
foreign nations that it refers to as “offshore corporate law havens”: Bermuda, 
the British Virgin Islands, and the Cayman Islands.97 The structure of this 
Part is as follows. Section A presents data on corporations listed in American 
securities markets that are increasingly opting to incorporate in foreign 
nations—in particular, offshore corporate law havens. Section B explores the 
structural design of offshore lawmaking processes. Unlike most American 
states, but similar to Delaware, offshore corporate law havens are small 
enough to make incorporation business a worthwhile venture for local 
lawmakers. Indeed, lawmakers in these jurisdictions rely heavily on 
incorporation fees, allowing them to credibly commit to maintaining 
favorable corporate governance rules.98 Section C explains how “local” 
lawyers and other interest groups in key offshore jurisdictions benefit from 
generating litigation and transactional work arising out of American 
corporations incorporated locally. This Section also explains how private 
law firms work closely with local lawmakers to swiftly enact corporate law 
statutes. Section D documents the emergence of specialized business courts 
in offshore jurisdictions that supply the judicial infrastructure necessary to 
handle complex corporate law disputes. 
A. The Rise of Offshore Corporate Law Havens 
Any analysis discussing trends on where “American” corporations 
choose to incorporate will inevitably confront definitional challenges 
regarding what type of corporations qualify as “American” corporations. The 
prevailing literature tends to use the term to describe corporations that are 
publicly traded in American securities markets and incorporated in one of 
 
 97 It is worth reemphasizing that I focus on these three jurisdictions only to concretize the concept of 
an international market for corporate law. This study should therefore not be taken to suggest that other 
foreign nations besides these offshore jurisdictions do not or cannot attract publicly traded American 
corporations. Indeed, the Marshall Islands and Ireland have also had some success attracting American 
corporations. 
 98 This is because corporate charters are relational contracts. As Professor Romano explains, because 
a charter “binds the state and firm in a multi-period relationship in which performance under the contract 
is not simultaneous . . . a state needs a mechanism by which it can commit to firms that it will maintain 
its code and otherwise not undo existing rules to firms’ disadvantage.” Roberta Romano, The States as a 
Laboratory: Legal Innovation and State Competition for Corporate Charters, 23 YALE J. ON REG. 209, 
212 (2006) [hereinafter Romano, States as a Laboratory]. 
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the constituent states of the United States.99 This approach does not account 
for at least two types of corporations: (1) corporations that principally 
operate within the territory of the United States but nevertheless choose 
foreign nations as their place of incorporation; and (2) corporations that 
principally operate outside the territory of the United States but may consider 
shopping for U.S. corporate law when choosing to list in American securities 
markets like the New York Stock Exchange. The semantic debate over what 
should count as an “American” corporation falls outside the scope of this 
paper. Instead, this Article investigates whether corporations with a 
substantial American factual nexus—corporations that operate physically in 
the United States or corporations that raise capital by listing in American 
securities markets—shop for corporate law produced by foreign nations. 
Specifically, I surveyed all publicly traded corporations listed in 
American securities markets, principally made up of corporations listed in 
the New York Stock Exchange and the NASDAQ.100 Using Standard & 
Poor’s Compustat database, a compilation of public financial data for 
publicly traded corporations, I gathered more than thirty years of all publicly 
available data from 1985 to 2018.101 As shown in Table 1, over 14% of firms 
trading on American securities markets are now incorporated in foreign 
nations. This represents a substantial growth from 1985, when only 2.7% of 
entities were incorporated in foreign nations. While Delaware continues to 
dominate the market, foreign nations now account for more than triple the 
number of companies incorporated in Nevada, which has been identified as 
 
 99 See, e.g., Marcel Kahan, The Demand for Corporate Law: Statutory Flexibility, Judicial Quality, 
or Takeover Protection?, 22 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 340, 348 (2006) (“Our initial sample consists of all public 
new issues of common stock between 1990 and 2002 by companies headquartered and incorporated in 
one of the 50 states or the District of Columbia contained in the SDC database.”); Peter Dodd & Richard 
Leftwich, The Market for Corporate Charters: “Unhealthy Competition” Versus Federal Regulation, 
53 J. BUS. 259, 261–62 (1980) (studying the proportion of firms incorporated in Delaware out of the total 
number of companies incorporated in the United States); id. at 263–64 (studying New York Stock 
Exchange-listed firms that reincorporated from one American state to another American state). 
 100 Data are on file with author. NASDAQ and the New York Stock Exchange are the two biggest 
securities markets in the United States. Other securities markets included in the study are companies listed 
in the American Stock Exchange, OTC Bulletin Board, Boston Stock Exchange, Midwest Exchange, 
Pacific Exchange, and Philadelphia Exchange. 
 101 A few details on the methodology of data collection are worth mentioning. I aggregated the data 
using Wharton Research Data Services’ Compustat. This aggregated dataset consisted of a large number 
of duplicate inputs. I filtered out the duplicates using the statistics software SPSS. Because Compustat 
includes firms listed in both Canadian and American securities markets, I used SPSS to filter out 
“Canadian” firms (for instance, firms that are only listed in the Toronto Stock Exchange are excluded). 
Because OTC includes both American and Canadian firms, I also excluded those firms listed in OTC that 
trade in Canadian currency. I also went through firms that did not have currency information manually to 
exclude Canadian firms. Using SPSS, I also disaggregated the data by jurisdiction of incorporation (coded 
“fic” for foreign nations and “loc” for constituent states of the United States). 
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the only other state besides Delaware actively vying to draw corporations 
that physically operate outside of its borders.102 
TABLE 1: INCORPORATION DECISIONS OF PUBLICLY TRADED CORPORATIONS LISTED IN 
AMERICAN SECURITIES MARKETS 
 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2016 2017 2018 
Delaware 42.4% 47.4% 49.2% 48.1% 47.6% 47.1% 48.5% 48.7% 48.3% 49.2% 
Nevada 2.5% 2.5% 2.5% 4.9% 5.3% 6.6% 5.8% 5.2% 4.8% 4.3% 
Foreign 
Nations 
2.7% 4.2% 6.6% 9.7% 11.7% 12.2% 13.6% 14.4% 15.1% 14.9% 
 
Several caveats warrant attention. Most notably, a significant part of the 
increase in foreign incorporation may be attributable to the changing 
demographics of firms trading in American securities markets.103 More 
specifically, it may be an indication of growth in the number of companies 
principally headquartered in foreign nations that are raising capital in 
American securities markets. For instance, Toyota Motors is a Japanese 
automobile manufacturer headquartered in Tokyo, but made its debut in the 
New York Stock Exchange in 1999.104 There are certainly increases 
attributable to these types of firms. These corporations typically use the 
corporate law of their “home” nation, appearing not to shop for corporate 
law.105 
 
 102 See Barzuza, supra note 29, at 940. 
 103 It is worth noting here that it is difficult (if not impossible) to compute the percentage of firms 
incorporated in foreign nations that are physically headquartered in the United States merely by collecting 
data on the firms’ stated headquarters reported to the SEC. This is because the SEC has not defined the 
“principal place of business,” and it is common for firms to abuse this shortcoming. See Where Is Your 
Corporation’s Principal Executive Office?, CAL. CORP. & SEC. L. BLOG, 
https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/where-is-your-corporation-s-principal-80235/ 
[https://perma.cc/6HMW-G4JX] (“The Securities and Exchange Commission, however, has not defined 
‘principal executive offices’ for purposes of Form 10-K.”). It is also relatively easy to manipulate the 
firms’ stated headquarters in certain industries. See Moon, Regulating Offshore Finance, supra note 12, 
at 12–15. Thus, this study relies on various indirect metrics to measure the growing market share captured 
by foreign nations. 
 104 Financial Information & Stock Price, TOYOTA, https://www.toyota.com/usa/investors/index.html 
[https://perma.cc/AH9Y-AFXL]. 
 105 Thus, for instance, Toyota Motors is incorporated in Japan and governed by Japanese corporate 
law, despite being listed on the New York Stock Exchange. See Toyota Motor Corp., Annual Report 
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But a sizable portion of the expanded share is attributable to firms that 
principally operate in the United States. As shown in Table 2, about a quarter 
of firms incorporated in foreign nations are accounted for by three 
jurisdictions that this Article has identified as “offshore corporate law 
havens”: the Cayman Islands, Bermuda, and the British Virgin Islands. This 
figure is important because the vast majority of corporations formed in these 
jurisdictions, which are widely known to draw clients from the United 
States,106 do not actually conduct their operations in those jurisdictions.107 
Typically, these corporations physically operate in “onshore” jurisdictions 
like the United States and have no connection to offshore jurisdictions other 
than the fact of incorporation—essentially glorified paperwork.108 This is the 
case even when corporations claim to have their headquarters in offshore 
jurisdictions. Consider, for instance, Theravance Biopharma, a company 
incorporated in the Cayman Islands. The company declares a P.O. Box in 
George Town, Cayman Islands, as its headquarters in its SEC filings.109 But 
even a cursory examination of the company’s disclosed real estate holdings 
in the same filings indicates that its physical headquarters are located in 
South San Francisco, California.110 
While still a small portion of the overall market, there is a clear trend in 
terms of the increase of market share captured by offshore corporate law 
havens. 
 
(Form 20-F) 131–32 (June 25, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1094517/ 
000119312518201591/d549954d20f.htm [https://perma.cc/33QF-ZSZD]. 
 106 See, e.g., SIEMENS, supra note 14, at 9. To be clear, these jurisdictions do not exclusively cater to 
firms based in the United States. For instance, firms based in China that are listed in NASDAQ or the 
New York Stock Exchange are frequently incorporated in the Cayman Islands or the British Virgin 
Islands. See William J. Moon, Delaware’s Global Competitiveness 5, 16 (Oct. 30, 2019) (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with author). Bermuda, however, appears to heavily cater to firms physically 
headquartered in the United States. According to my survey of SEC disclosures looking at real property 
ownership and revenue source data, for instance, approximately 40% to 50% of all publicly traded 
Bermuda companies listed in the United States today appear to be actually headquartered in the United 
States, notwithstanding the fact that the majority of these firms claim that they are headquartered in 
Bermuda. William J. Moon, Appendix 1: “Bermuda” Corporations Listed in American Securities Markets 
(on file with author).  
 107 See Moon, Regulating Offshore Finance, supra note 12, at 9. 
 108 See William J. Moon, Tax Havens as Producers of Corporate Law, 116 MICH. L. REV. 1081, 
1095 (2018) [hereinafter Moon, Tax Havens]. This shows that a sizable portion of the increase is 
attributable to firms that shop for the corporate law. See Barzuza, supra note 29, at 948 n.33. 
 109 See, e.g., Theravance Biopharma, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Dec. 31, 2017). 
 110 See id. at 56 (“Our principal physical properties in the US consist of approximately 170,000 
square feet of office and laboratory space leased in two buildings in South San Francisco, California. The 
lease was extended in November 2017 and expires in May 2030.”). 
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TABLE 2: FOREIGN CORPORATIONS INCORPORATED IN OFFSHORE CORPORATE LAW HAVENS 
 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2016 2017 2018 
Bermuda 5.1% 5.8% 8.2% 6.6% 7.5% 6.9% 6.3% 6.3% 5.8% 5.8% 
Cayman 
Islands 




0.6% 1.8% 2.1% 2.6% 2.5% 4.1% 4.3% 4.8% 4.7% 4.5% 
Total 8.0% 10.6% 12.8% 12.0% 17.9% 26.4% 24.5% 26.7% 29.0% 28.8% 
 
To be sure, whether corporations incorporate in foreign nations for 
corporate law or for some other reason, like tax reduction, is difficult to test. 
But the prevailing account that attributes everything to tax incentives breaks 
down under deeper consideration. 
For one, there are dozens of “tax havens” that offer 0% corporate and 
capital gains tax.111 Yet, corporations traded on American securities markets 
like the New York Stock Exchange tend to cluster around only a handful of 
jurisdictions,112 suggesting that there is something more than tax motivating 
their behavior. Second, far from offering archaic corporate governance rules, 
offshore corporate law havens frequently update their corporate law 
statutes—largely in response to private sector demand. For instance, the 
Cayman Islands has updated its Companies Law at least fifty-eight times 
since originally enacted in 1964.113 Official government publications do not 
 
 111 According to one notable study, there are “roughly 40 major tax havens in the world today.” 
Dhammika Dharmapala & James R. Hines Jr., Which Countries Become Tax Havens?, 93 J. PUB. ECON. 
1058, 1058 (2009). 
 112 See supra Table 1 and Table 2. 
 113 See CONYERS DILL & PEARMAN, CAYMAN ISLANDS COMPANIES LAW 1–2 (2018), 
https://www.conyers.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/Cayman_Companies_Law_Conyers.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/A8EW-37XN]. The frequency of updates is not unusual for leading offshore 
jurisdictions. Bermuda, for instance, has amended or updated its corporate law at least forty-five times. 
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shy away from pronouncing the factors motivating amendments to their 
corporate law statutes. For instance, the Cayman Islands government 
describes the purpose of legal updates as improving “the competitiveness 
and attractiveness of companies incorporated in the jurisdiction.”114 Indeed, 
if offshore jurisdictions were just about tax reduction, they might simply try 
to copy and paste Delaware’s General Corporation Law. But, as elaborated 
in Part III, offshore corporate law havens have opted to differentiate their 
corporate law from that of Delaware. Third, even after several federal 
legislation and administrative orders in the United States aimed at curbing 
tax avoidance, many corporations have remained incorporated in foreign 
nations.115 This may be due to path dependency, but it could also be driven 
by attractive corporate governance rules offered in foreign jurisdictions. 
Incorporation decisions of American firms following the new federal 
tax bill provide a particularly important datapoint. The Tax Cuts and Jobs 
Act of 2017,116 which includes a provision designed to reduce the incentive 
for transnational corporate tax arbitrage,117 does not appear to have slowed 
down offshore incorporation. Connecticut-based Biohaven Pharmaceuticals, 
New Jersey-based Watford Holdings, Massachusetts-based Kiniksa 
Pharmaceuticals, New York-based Replay Acquisition Corporation, and 
New Jersey-based Hudson Group are a few recent examples of corporations 
listed on the New York Stock Exchange or NASDAQ that chose to 
incorporate offshore, instead of in Delaware, to go public.118 Publicly 
available SEC filings indicate that the companies choosing to incorporate in 
 
 114 CAYMAN IS. GOV’T, PLAN AND ESTIMATES FOR THE 2018 FINANCIAL YEAR & FOR THE 2019 
FINANCIAL YEAR 26 (2017), http://www.gov.ky/portal/pls/portal/docs/1/12612394.PDF 
[https://perma.cc/VM67-ZKX3] [hereinafter CAYMAN IS. GOV’T, PLAN & ESTIMATES]. 
 115 See, e.g., Talley, supra note 12, at 1748–51. 
 116 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, Pub. L. No. 115-97, 131 Stat. 2054 (2017). 
 117 See David Kamin et al., The Games They Will Play: Tax Games, Roadblocks, and Glitches Under 
the 2017 Tax Legislation, 103 MINN. L. REV. 1439, 1488 (2019) (“[T]he old system of U.S. international 
tax rules, prior to the new tax legislation, was also the subject of considerable tax gaming and inefficiency. 
As measured against the baseline of old law, some of the new rules represent modest improvements.”); 
Susan C. Morse, International Cooperation and the 2017 Tax Act, 128 YALE L.J. F. 362, 380 (2018) 
(assessing that the new tax bill’s base erosion and anti-abuse tax “should function as an anti-tax haven 
measure”); Jonathan D. Rockoff & Nina Trentmann, New Tax Law Haunts Companies That Did 
‘Inversion’ Deals, WALL STREET J. (Feb. 11, 2018, 7:00 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/new-tax-
law-haunts-companies-that-did-inversion-deals-1518350401 [https://perma.cc/QC37-9832]. 
 118 See Biohaven Pharm. Holding Co., Prospectus (Form 424B4) 10 (Dec. 12, 2018) (Virgin Is.); 
Watford Holdings, Ltd., Prospectus (Form 424B3) 236 (Mar. 26, 2019) (Berm.); Kiniksa Pharm., Ltd., 
Prospectus (Form 424B4) 7 (May 23, 2018) (Berm.); Replay Acquisition Corp., Prospectus (Form 
424B4) 1 (Apr. 3, 2019) (Cayman Is.); Hudson Grp., Ltd., Prospectus (Form 424B1) 10 (Jan. 31, 2018) 
(Berm.). 
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foreign nations are well-counseled about the content of offshore corporate 
law—presumably indicating that they are making informed decisions.119 
B. “Captured” Lawmakers: Offshore Governments Rely Heavily on 
Incorporation Fees 
Of course, the proposition that offshore governments even produce laws 
accommodating private sector preferences cannot be taken for granted. At 
least in theory, the government revenue generated from firms incorporated 
offshore ought to be significant enough from the local lawmakers’ point of 
view to make the venture worthwhile.120 This Section thus examines the 
extent to which offshore lawmakers are reliant on incorporation-related 
revenue—namely, franchise tax and incorporation fees—as a rough metric 
of understanding legislative behavior. 
Revenue data, assembled from official government publications of the 
British Virgin Islands, Bermuda, and the Cayman Islands, help to assess 
whether lawmakers in these jurisdictions are indeed reliant on fees from 
locally incorporated firms.121 These data appear to back up anecdotal 
accounts that these lawmakers—lacking a source of significant revenue 
besides tourism—rely heavily on incorporation fees.122 As shown in Tables 
3 through 5, this reliance is not uniformly strong across these jurisdictions. 
In recent years, the British Virgin Islands, for example, has derived over half 
of its government revenue from incorporation-related fees. Bermuda, on the 
other hand, derived 6.3% to 7.1% of its revenues from annual incorporation 
fees. To put these numbers in perspective, Delaware’s incorporation fee 
revenues, which are often heralded as the textbook case of legislative 
 
 119 See infra Section III.A. 
 120 See Kahan & Kamar, Myth, supra note 28, at 687–88. 
 121 Several notes on the limitation of the data presented here are worth mentioning. First, exact year-
to-year comparison is not possible, because both Bermuda and the Cayman Islands report revenue figures 
from mid-year to mid-year. Second, these jurisdictions do not supply revenue data broken down by type 
of business entity. Therefore, the numbers include fees derived from both closely held and publicly traded 
business entities, although the data exclude fees from “funds” or “banking,” where possible. Even if a 
significant proportion of their revenues are derived from closely held business entities, the fact that 
offshore corporate law havens regularly update their corporate law statutes makes it likely that they derive 
a significant percentage of their revenue from publicly traded corporations. 
 122 Ezra Fieser, Indebted Caribbean Tax Havens Look to Tax Foreign Investors, CHRISTIAN SCI. 
MONITOR (Nov. 26, 2012), https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Americas/2012/1126/Indebted-
Caribbean-tax-havens-look-to-tax-foreign-investors [https://perma.cc/2PNJ-MD49] (“[I]ndustry analysts 
and tax specialists believe new fees and taxes will bring in needed money for government coffers while 
doing little harm to the business community.”). 
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dependence on corporate charter fees, averaged 17% of the state’s total tax 
revenue over the past several decades.123 
TABLE 3: BERMUDA REVENUE SOURCE (IN BERMUDIAN DOLLARS)124 









2014–2015 $62.78 million $880.41 million 7.13% 
2015–2016 $60.82 million $935.43 million 6.50% 
2016–2017 $62.61 million $987.99 million 6.34% 
 
TABLE 4: THE BRITISH VIRGIN ISLANDS REVENUE SOURCE (IN U.S. DOLLARS)125 
 Taxes Related to 







2015 $171.16 million $314.70 million 54.39% 
2016 $164.94 million $307.06 million 53.71% 
2017 $170.04 million $290.98 million 58.43% 
 
 
 123 Romano, States as a Laboratory, supra note 98, at 212–13 (“This financial dependency on 
incorporation fees makes Delaware highly responsive to the requirements of corporations for an updated 
legal regime; it cannot afford to lose domestic corporations from being slow to update its code. Because 
it would lose a major revenue source if the number of domestic incorporations markedly declined, 
Delaware is a hostage to its own success, which makes credible a commitment to corporate law 
responsiveness.”). 
 124 GOV’T OF BERM., 2016–2017 BUDGET STATEMENT 40 (2016), 
https://www.gov.bm/sites/default/files/2016-2017-Budget-Statement.pdf [https://perma.cc/6H29-SY7S] 
(2014–2015 revenue data and 2015–2016 revenue data); GOV’T OF BERM., 2018–2019 BUDGET 
STATEMENT 33 (2018), https://www.gov.bm/sites/default/files/2018-Budget-Statement_Web.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/UG5Y-ZQYV] (2016–2017 revenue data). 
 125 GOV’T OF THE VIRGIN IS., 2018 BUDGET ESTIMATES 7–9 (2018), 
http://www.bvi.gov.vg/pub/2018%20Budget%20Estimates.pdf [https://perma.cc/7UQN-57HT] (2016–
2017 revenue data) [hereinafter BVI BUDGET 2018]; GOV’T OF THE VIRGIN IS., 2017 BUDGET ESTIMATES 
8–10 (2017), http://www.bvi.gov.vg/pub/2017%20Budget%20Estimates.pdf [https://perma.cc/9NF9-
PXAQ] (2015 revenue data). 
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TABLE 5: THE CAYMAN ISLANDS REVENUE SOURCE (IN CAYMAN ISLANDS DOLLARS)126 
 
“Company Fees” from 








2014–2015 $98.49 million $891.07 million 11.05% 
2015–2016 $99.86 million $712.42 million 14.02% 
2016–2017 
(estimate) 
$79.85 million $623.21 million 12.81% 
 
These data are crucial for several reasons. Primarily, heavy reliance on 
incorporation fees makes offshore lawmakers highly sensitive to private 
sector preferences on corporate governance rules.127 Relatedly, this reliance 
lends credibility to lawmakers’ responsiveness to private sector demand in 
the face of evolving market conditions.128 
This analysis also helps demystify a degree of perplexity about the 
motivations driving offshore jurisdiction competition to attract foreign 
companies. Professor Talley, for instance, has observed that the objectives 
of offshore tax havens appear to “have little to do with tax earnings 
maximization,”129 suggesting that these jurisdictions potentially “crave 
international fame and prominence that comes with a high market share of 
incorporations”130 or share some sort of “commitments on taxes.”131 Offshore 
corporate law havens, however, do not typically levy corporate taxes or taxes 
imposed on income derived from local activities for foreign corporations 
incorporated locally. These data instead suggest that the motives of offshore 
 
 126 CAYMAN IS. GOV’T, PLAN & ESTIMATES, supra note 114, at 332, 405 (2015–2016 revenue data 
and 2016–2017 data estimate); CAYMAN IS. GOV’T, PLAN & ESTIMATES FOR THE 18-MONTH PERIOD 
ENDING 31 DECEMBER 2017, at 365, 386 (2013), 
http://www.gov.ky/portal/pls/portal/docs/1/12310534.PDF [https://perma.cc/ZY7C-SAMZ] (2014–2015 
revenue data). 
 127 The governments in these jurisdictions are acutely aware of the competition from other foreign 
nations. See, e.g., BVI BUDGET 2018, supra note 125, at ix (“There are jurisdictions competing to take 
on our market share in financial services . . . if and where we fall short.”). 
 128 See ROMANO, GENIUS, supra note 2, at 38 (“[A] state with a large proportion of its budget 
financed by the franchise tax will be responsive to firms, since it has so much to lose.”). 
 129 Talley, supra note 12, at 1716. 
 130 Id. 
 131 Id. 
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corporate law havens are not too different than those of Delaware.132 And, 
like Delaware, offshore corporate law havens rely on the profits from 
recurring franchise and incorporation fees received from locally registered 
business entities.133 This reliance sets the stage for offshore lawmakers to be 
“captured” by the private sector in their production of corporate law. 
C. The Role of Lawyers and Other “Local” Interest Groups 
To focus exclusively on government coffers to explain the behavior of 
legislators would neglect another pivotal aspect of corporate lawmaking 
process—the various interest groups, including lawyers, accountants, and 
other stakeholders who stand to benefit from attracting foreign corporations, 
that also drive the corporate lawmaking process in offshore corporate law 
havens, just as they do in the domestic context.134 Accounting for these 
interest groups refines the crude theory of legislative behavior that 
presupposes revenue maximization as the objective of domestic and offshore 
governments.135 
Studying Delaware, Professors Jonathan Macey and Geoffrey Miller 
laid the theoretical foundation for an interest group approach to studying 
 
 132 See Moon, Regulating Offshore Finance, supra note 12, at 10–11. The lack of corporate tax thus 
accounts for Professor Talley’s assessment, as well as that of critics of “tax havens” who characterize 
these jurisdictions as parasitic entities that enable corporations to evade or avoid domestic tax. See also 
Moon, Tax Havens, supra note 108, at 1081–82. 
 133 Consistent with others who have observed that market-dominant jurisdictions are able to 
command higher annual franchise tax, offshore corporate law havens appear to be able to charge high 
annual franchise fees. It is well-established that Delaware exploits its market-dominant position in the 
incorporation market to price discriminate. As Professors Marcel Kahan and Ehud Kamar explain, 
“Delaware uses its uniquely structured franchise tax to charge a higher incorporation price to public 
corporations than it does to nonpublic corporations, and that among public corporations, it charges a 
higher price to larger corporations than it does to smaller ones.” Marcel Kahan & Ehud Kamar, Price 
Discrimination in the Market for Corporate Law, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 1205, 1209 (2001) [hereinafter 
Kahan & Kamar, Price Discrimination]. Similar traits are found in offshore corporate law havens. In 
Bermuda, for instance, annual fees start at $2,095 and increase on a sliding scale up to $32,676—
calculated according to issued share capital. See WALKERS, CLIENT MEMO: GLOBAL – COMPARISON OF 
COMPANIES – CAYMAN ISLANDS, BRITISH VIRGIN ISLANDS, BERMUDA, JERSEY, GUERNSEY AND 
IRELAND 3 (2019), https://www.walkersglobal.com/images/Publications/Memo/Global/ 
Global_Comparison_of_Companies.pdf [https://perma.cc/5FPS-DH69]. 
 134 Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Structure of Corporation Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1461, 1511 
(1989) (“Not all states are motivated solely by the goal of maximizing franchise-tax revenues. Many 
states are at least weakly motivated by the goal of maximizing the revenues of the local corporate bar . . . . 
Furthermore, legislatures are not private sellers, but public actors. Attracting the business of principals 
by making side payments to agents is a morally dubious enterprise. For some legislators, public morality 
will be an important constraint on the willingness to engage in that enterprise. The extent of that 
willingness also undoubtedly varies from state to state.”). 
 135 See Romano, Law as a Product, supra note 37, at 228. 
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American corporate law.136 Their account revealed that attracting corporate 
charters not only benefits the state legislature that accrues franchise taxes 
annually, but also various interest groups that benefit from the spillover 
effects of drawing incorporation business.137 Professors Macey and Miller 
concluded that Delaware’s preeminent corporate law regime principally 
serves to benefit “Wilmington lawyers who practice corporate law in the 
state.”138 
In the international context, evaluating offshore corporate law havens 
within an interest group framework also reveals the inner workings of these 
jurisdictions. Generally, the ability of local lawmakers to raise a sizable 
portion of their budget from incorporation fees, principally from foreign 
sources, allows offshore corporate law havens to lower taxes on domestic 
constituents.139 However, certain local constituencies, or special interest 
groups, tend to benefit more than others. Special beneficiaries include local 
residents that provide services to locally incorporated corporations, from 
registered agents to property owners leasing small offices or mailboxes, to 
foreign business entities.140 A number of locals also explicitly benefit from 
laws that increase the value of their residency status. For instance, under 
Bermuda law, at least one director, secretary, or representative of a 
corporation must be a resident of Bermuda.141 Local residents routinely serve 
 
 136 See Macey & Miller, supra note 43. 
 137 Others have extended this framework, building an impressive catalog of law review articles 
devoted to studying Delaware using an interest group framework. See, e.g., Douglas M. Branson, 
Indeterminacy: The Final Ingredient in an Interest Group Analysis of Corporate Law, 43 VAND. L. REV. 
85 (1990). 
 138 Macey & Miller, supra note 43, at 472. This account has been highly influential, although scholars 
assign different persuasive value as to its explanatory power. See, e.g., ROMANO, GENIUS, supra note 2, 
at 30 (“Although I am skeptical of the strong form of Macey and Miller’s claim that Delaware’s 
corporation code favors lawyers over shareholders, Delaware’s commanding position in the charter 
market may possibly enable the corporate bar to siphon a share of Delaware’s monopoly rents by 
generating some laws that decrease firm value and increase attorney income.”). 
 139 This is strictly from the point of view of that jurisdiction. From the international community’s 
standpoint, welfare effects are mixed at best. See Moon, Tax Havens, supra note 108, at 1094 (“When 
accounting for tax incentives, the fact that consumers of corporate law have not advocated a replacement 
of the current system, which is often taken as the best evidence of the welfare-enhancing effects of 
jurisdictional competition, cannot be assumed.” (citation omitted)). 
 140 To be sure, whether the distribution of benefits is completely lopsided within these jurisdictions 
depends on the level of public services that the governments in these jurisdictions provide to their citizens 
and how these are distributed. This is because presumably the level of local public service would be lower 
without franchise revenues. I am grateful to Professor Romano for this point. 
 141 Bermuda Companies Act of 1981, § 130(1) (Berm.); Natalie Town & Jonathan Betts, Corporate 
Governance and Directors’ Duties in Bermuda: Overview, THOMPSON REUTERS PRAC. L. (2015), 
https://content.next.westlaw.com/Document/I2030ee541cb611e38578f7ccc38dcbee/View/FullText.htm
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as “dummy” directors for hundreds, if not thousands, of companies, playing 
little or no actual role in the entities’ operations.142 Foreign corporations thus 
help create jobs in the local economy. Lawyers, unsurprisingly, benefit from 
the structure of offshore incorporations as well. In Delaware, the bulk of the 
financial gains go to corporate transactional lawyers and litigators, as 
evidenced by the fact that Delaware lawyers have the highest average income 
in the country.143 The corporate lawyers that benefit offshore, fascinatingly, 
are not entirely “local.” They are principally made up of an elite cadre of 
lawyers who work in “offshore magic circle” law firms—a colloquial term 
given to law firms that have established physical offices in strategic offshore 
jurisdictions like Jersey, Bermuda, the British Virgin Islands, Hong Kong, 
and the Seychelles.144 A significant fraction of the lawyers who practice law 
in these jurisdictions are foreign citizens who move offshore and are 
accredited to practice locally. In addition to warm weather and sandy 
beaches, these jurisdictions offer minimal income tax rates to attract foreign 




 142 The same is true for many closely held business entities. To form feeder funds in the Cayman 
Islands, managers must hire directors who are physically present in the territory of the Cayman Islands. 
These directors, who serve as directors in hundreds—if not thousands—of entities, typically play little or 
no role in the management of the fund—explaining why they typically do not exist in domestic hedge 
funds. See Moon, Regulating Offshore Finance, supra note 12, at 50. As Professor John Morley explains, 
the so-called “dummy directors” exist in offshore jurisdictions like the Cayman Islands “typically because 
quirks of law in offshore jurisdictions require it.” John Morley, The Separation of Funds and Managers: 
A Theory of Investment Fund Structure and Regulation, 123 YALE L.J. 1228, 1253 (2014) [hereinafter 
Morley, Investment Fund]. 
 143 Kahan & Kamar, Myth, supra note 28, at 695. According to the influential public choice theory, 
lawyers in Delaware financially benefit from the steady stream of shareholder litigation (and related 
business law disputes) brought involving Delaware corporations. See Jonathan Macey, Delaware: Home 
of the World’s Most Expensive Raincoat, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1131, 1136–37 (2005) (“[T]he . . . 
sophisticated body of corporate law in Delaware comes with a heavy price, extracted by powerful interest 
groups within the state, particularly lawyers, who enjoy the dominant position within the culture that 
generates corporate law rules.”). 
 144 An example of a successful “offshore magic circle” law firm is Appleby. The firm, which gained 
international notoriety in 2017 from massive document leaks that made international headlines as the 
Paradise Papers, has offices in Bermuda, the British Virgin Islands, the Cayman Islands, Guernsey, Hong 
Kong, Isle of Man, Jersey, Mauritius, the Seychelles, and Shanghai. About Us, APPLEBY, 
https://www.applebyglobal.com/about/ [https://perma.cc/FB7R-L8FQ]. 
 145 As a Financial Times spread explains, offshore law firms actively recruit foreign lawyers who 
are “drawn by the sun, low income tax rates and the prospect of becoming a partner faster.” Madison 
Marriage & Barney Thompson, ‘Offshore Magic Circle’ Law Firms Fear Paradise Papers Fallout, FIN. 
TIMES (Nov. 9, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/8aff482c-c4a3-11e7-b2bb-322b2cb39656 
[https://perma.cc/4AWF-SMJ4]. Unsurprisingly, specialized recruitment firms have emerged, recruiting 
lawyers from the United States by promising low tax rates, warm weather, and proximity to the United 
States. See HAMILTON RECRUITMENT, LIVING & WORKING OFFSHORE: A GUIDE FOR LAWYERS 2, 
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law firms to draw clients from the United States and the United Kingdom,146 
although some New York “Big Law” firms have recently entered alone to 
get a share of this booming business.147 
Of course, there is nothing inherently pernicious about lawyers getting 
rich. Indeed, a crucial ingredient in Delaware’s corporate law regime is the 
legislature’s responsiveness to local interest groups.148 In Delaware, there is 
an “unwritten compact between the bar and the state legislature,” wherein 
Delaware lawmakers regularly “call upon the expertise of the Corporation 
Law Section of the Delaware Bar Association to recommend, review and 
draft almost all amendments to the statute.”149 The lawmaking process in 
offshore corporate law havens is not too different from Delaware, although 
fewer lawyers control the lawmaking process. In virtually all these 
incorporation havens, the process of proposing and drafting corporate 
legislation is controlled by as few as one or two firms.150 This process is far 
from a secret. It is not unusual for law firms to advertise their close working 
 
http://www.hamilton-recruitment.com/HR_Downloads/OffshoreGuideForLawyers.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/V7BB-HN9S] (“Bermuda, the British Virgin Islands and the Cayman Islands share the 
characteristics of low tax, a common law legal system, the benefits of a Caribbean-style climate and 
proximity to the United States.”). 
 146 See Marriage & Thompson, supra note 145 (“Large international law firms in New York and 
London, many of which work with offshore companies to help their clients structure their investments, 
have warned staff against discussing the Paradise Papers publicly. DLA Piper, which was itself hit by a 
cyber-attack this year, sent a memo to staff on Tuesday, seen by the Financial Times, warning them 
against publicly commenting on the documents, as several of its clients were affected by the leak.”). 
 147 See, e.g., Press Release, Sidley, Sidley Advises on Successful US $3.8  
Billion Restructuring of Ocean Rig UDW (Sept. 22, 2017), https://www.sidley.com/en/newslanding/ 
newsannouncements/2017/09/sidley-advises-on-successful-us-3-8-billion-restructuring-of-ocean-rig-
udw [https://perma.cc/R2QY-7A7G] (“Sidley represented Simon Appell of AlixPartners and Eleanor 
Fisher of Kalo . . . . The restructuring was implemented through four separate and interconnected Cayman 
Islands-law governed schemes of arrangement . . . .”); see also Scott Flaherty, What It Takes to Dominate 
in the Elite Game of International Litigation, AM. LAW. (Sept. 28, 2017), 
https://kobrekim.com/assets/Uploads/What-It-Takes-to-Dominate-in-the-Elite-Game-of-International-
Litigation-The-American-Lawyer.pdf [https://perma.cc/U3R2-U8Y7] (“Kobre & Kim has lawyers 
stationed in offshore jurisdictions like the British Virgin Islands and Cayman Islands—something that 
can come in handy if, say, a client needs a lawyer in Hong Kong but is going up against a BVI-registered 
company . . . .”). 
 148 Romano, Corporate Law Redux, supra note 29, at 363 (calling Delaware’s corporate bar the 
“catalyst” when corporate codes are updated). 
 149 LEWIS S. BLACK, JR., WHY CORPORATIONS CHOOSE DELAWARE 4 (2007). This group consists of 
twenty-one transactional and litigation attorneys representing small and large law firms in Wilmington, 
Delaware. See Hamermesh, supra note 31, at 1755–56; see also Romano, Corporate Law Redux, supra 
note 29, at 364 (explaining that the powerful corporate bar “monitors and identifies needed legislative 
changes . . . and the Delaware legislature in turn responds to the bar’s pulling the fire alarm by enacting 
the proposed initiatives”). 
 150 Briant, supra note 35, at 63. 
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relationships with offshore legislatures to their clients.151 According to a 
report commissioned by the British Virgin Islands government, the country’s 
financial services law is a byproduct of “regular meetings with the private 
sector,” which includes the Bankers Association and the Financial Services 
Advisory Committee.152 Indeed, the legendary legislation that gave birth to 
an offshore financial services market in the British Virgin Islands was 
introduced by a Shearman & Sterling lawyer from New York.153 This process 
of public–private partnership ensures that the laws on the books stay up-to-
date and reflect private sector preferences.154 In the British Virgin Islands, 
for instance, a group of prominent private sector lawyers serving on the 
Financial Services Commission provide specific input relating to 
amendments on the British Virgin Islands’ Companies Act (BVI’s corporate 
law statute).155 For example, as recently as June 2018, the Commission 
advised the cabinet of the British Virgin Islands to revise the Companies Act 
by lowering penalties for corporate noncompliance.156  
Legislative committees in the Cayman Islands similarly illustrate how 
the private sector dictates the content of corporate law. The Cayman Islands 
Constitution formally recognizes the Attorney General as the chief legal 
 
 151 See John Christensen, Do They Do Evil? The Moral Economy of Tax Professionals, in 
NEOLIBERALISM AND THE MORAL ECONOMY OF FRAUD 72, 80 (David Whyte & Jörg Wiegratz eds., 
2016) (“Appleby Partners have been members of the elected legislatures, and ministers in governments 
in a number of offshore financial centres.” (footnote omitted)). 
 152 LAWS CONSOL., INC., CONSULTANT’S REPORT FOR BRITISH VIRGIN ISLANDS: COMPUTERISATION 
AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE 3–4 (1998), 
http://lawsconsolidated.com/cms3/phocadownload/Reports/British%20Virgin%20Islands%20Report.pd
f [https://perma.cc/4FAM-GHRA]. 
 153 See Colin Riegels, British Virgin Islands: A Tough Act to Follow, MONDAQ (July 20, 2014), 
http://www.mondaq.com/x/327334/offshore+financial+centres/A+Tough+Act+To+Follow 
[https://perma.cc/GD7S-5YDU] (describing how the International Business Companies Act in the British 
Virgin Islands was drafted by “a Wall Street lawyer named Paul Butler from renowned New York law 
firm Shearman & Sterling”). 
 154 See, e.g., Government Boards and Committees, GOV’T BERM., https://www.gov.bm/government-
boards-and-committees [https://perma.cc/GQS8-K9SD]. 
 155 See THE VIRGIN IS. FIN. SERVS. COMM’N, ANNUAL REPORT 2014, at 43 (2014), 
http://www.bvifsc.vg/sites/default/files/annual_report_2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/6LJM-NXB8] 
(explaining how the commission helps draft bills, regulations, and other subsidiary legislation); see also 
Governance, VIRGIN IS. FIN. SERVS. COMMISSION, http://www.bvifsc.vg/about-us/governance/board-of-
commissioners [https://perma.cc/SAJ8-4ASY] (providing the names and biographies of the 
Commission’s membership). Michael Riegels, a founding partner of the offshore law firm Harneys and 
one of the original drafters of the BVI Companies Act, was selected as the first chairman of the board. 
See Press Release, Virgin Is. Fin. Servs. Comm’n, British Virgin Islands Financial Services Commission 
Board Appoints an Additional External Commissioner (June 12, 2012), 
http://www.bvifsc.vg/news/british-virgin-islands-financial-services-commission-board-appoints-
additional-external [https://perma.cc/Q57T-6WT3]; Riegels, supra note 153. 
 156 See Business Companies Act (Amendment of Schedule 1) (No. 2) Order, 2018 (Virgin Is.). 
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adviser to the Legislative Assembly.157 The Attorney General delegates this 
authority to several subcommittees to allow leading offshore lawyers to draft 
actual legislation. The former managing partner of a prominent offshore law 
firm, Maples and Calder, described the process bluntly: “[T]he private sector 
[identifies] areas of particular need and tak[es] a first cut at drafting the 
legislation to meet it. The private sector will always be best placed to 
undertake that role because of its relations with onshore professionals who 
can pinpoint precisely what needs to be drafted to achieve the effect they 
seek.”158 
The private sector not only helps draft laws, but also helps corporate 
clients navigate local administrative requirements. Local law firms typically 
bundle and sell corporate law “packages” that satisfy all local administrative 
requirements, ranging from appointing resident directors to maintaining 
corporate books in the territory of the incorporating jurisdiction.159 
All in all, prominent private sector lawyers are instrumental in writing 
the content of corporate governance rules in leading offshore jurisdictions, 
exerting influence as de facto lawmakers. 
D. The Rise of Offshore Business Courts 
Despite their arguably favorable corporate governance regimes, 
offshore corporate law havens may still lack the judicial infrastructure 
necessary to compete with Delaware. While any given jurisdiction can copy 
and paste laws from Delaware, it is difficult to transplant Delaware’s 
renowned judicial system. This is the principal explanation offered to explain 
why other states like Maryland have not been successful at competing with 
Delaware. The advantages offered by Delaware include: (1) the Delaware 
Chancery Court, where judges who have corporate law expertise resolve 
 
 157 Portfolio of Legal Affairs, CAYMAN IS. GOV’T, http://www.gov.ky/portal/page/portal/plghome/ 
what-we-do [https://perma.cc/H9KR-YEZS]. 
 158 Charles Jennings, The Financial Services Legislative Committee, CAYMAN FIN. REV. MAG. (Aug. 
3, 2011), https://www.caymanfinancialreview.com/2011/08/03/the-financial-services-legislative-
committee/ [https://perma.cc/F72F-K3QW]. 
 159 One leading law firm in Bermuda, for instance, arranges for the following services under a 
standard agreement: “i) Bermuda resident directors (if required); ii) Company secretary (to maintain the 
corporate records of the client company); iii) Maintaining the minute book, share register and register of 
directors & officers; iv) Providing registered office facilities for the client company; v) Liaising with 
government departments with respect to annual filings and any changes to the constitutional documents 
of the company; vi) Liaising with banks and other service providers such as accountants and auditors.” 
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disputes without juries;160 (2) the meritocratic nature of selecting Chancery 
Court judges;161 and (3) the steady production of case law that reduces 
uncertainty in the application of substantive law.162 These advantages amount 
to an unusually high barrier to entry that make it difficult for other states to 
compete.163 Although other states are aware of Delaware’s lucrative revenue 
stream,164 few have attempted to give a run for Delaware’s money, and even 
fewer have actually succeeded.165 
That assumption does not hold true for small foreign nations. In the past 
decade or two, offshore corporate law havens have launched specialized 
business courts aimed at resolving complex commercial disputes: the 
Bermuda Commercial Court (2006), the Commercial Division of High Court 
in the British Virgin Islands (2009), and the Financial Services Division of 
the Cayman Islands Grand Court (2009).166 These specialized business courts 
were built specifically to resolve disputes that arise from foreign firms 
incorporated locally, typically separated from the garden variety of local 
civil and criminal matters. For instance, in the Cayman Islands, all actions 
under Part XVII of the Companies Act (Cayman’s corporate law statute) are 
required to be brought in the Financial Services Division.167 Moreover, like 
 
 160 Kahan & Kamar, Myth, supra note 28, at 708; see also Bernard S. Black, Is Corporate Law 
Trivial?: A Political and Economic Analysis, 84 NW. U. L. REV. 542, 590 (1990) (“Delaware’s governor, 
mindful of the value of corporate charters, often deliberately appoints judges with corporate expertise.”); 
Mark J. Roe, Juries and the Political Economy of Legal Origin, 35 J. COMP. ECON. 294, 294 (2007) 
[hereinafter Roe, Juries] (“[T]he usual view in legal circles is that the jury’s absence (and the resulting 
decision-making by expert judges, not juries), is a strength of the court, not a weakness.”). 
 161 Kahan & Kamar, Myth, supra note 28, at 708 (stating that a nominating commission chooses 
Chancery Court judges). 
 162 See id. (explaining that Delaware’s widely published case law provides guidance to practitioners). 
 163 See id. (“One would expect states trying to attract incorporations to establish similar courts. But 
none has.” (citation omitted)). 
 164 In recent decades, Delaware has earned approximately “$440 million per year in franchise taxes 
and related fees.” Fisch, Peculiar Role, supra note 23, at 1061. 
 165 See John F. Coyle, Business Courts and Interstate Competition, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1915, 
1920 (2012) (stating that other states have not replicated unique aspects of Delaware courts, including 
their focus on corporate law and lack of juries); Kahan & Kamar, Myth, supra note 28, at 724–36. 
 166 TIM PRUDHOE & ALEXANDER W. HEYLIN, KOBRE & KIM, BRITISH VIRGIN ISLANDS (2018), 
https://kobrekim.com/assets/Uploads/PDFs/Getting-the-Deal-Through-Asset-Recovery-2018-British-
Virgin-Islands-2.PDF?url=/assets/Uploads/Getting-the-Deal-Through-Asset-Recovery-2018-British-
Virgin-Islands-2.PDF [https://perma.cc/B56P-P4MA]; Bermuda’s Commercial Court: The First Five 
Years, ROYAL GAZETTE (Mar. 2, 2012, 8:12 AM), 
http://www.royalgazette.com/article/20120302/BUSINESS/703029943 [https://perma.cc/2R27-ZAR4]; 
Alan Markoff, Cayman’s Judiciary Grows with the Times, CAYMAN FIN. REV. (Jan. 5, 2011), 
https://www.caymanfinancialreview.com/2011/01/05/caymans-judiciary-grows-with-the-times/ 
[https://perma.cc/N7GH-4RVH]. 
 167 Sam Dawson & Peter Sherwood, Litigation and Enforcement in the Cayman Islands: Overview, 
THOMPSON REUTERS PRAC. L. (2019), https://us.practicallaw.thomsonreuters.com/2-633-8594 (last 
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Delaware, offshore corporate law havens have uniformly eliminated jury 
trials for corporate law disputes,168 allowing cases to be resolved relatively 
swiftly and predictably. 
Reminiscent of judges on the Delaware Court of Chancery, offshore 
corporate law havens are staffed by judges with business law expertise who 
are commissioned on a merit-based system.169 But there are important 
differences. Unlike Delaware’s Chancery Court judges, who are required to 
be “Delaware citizens,”170 offshore judges in many circumstances are foreign 
citizens. Consider the Financial Services Division of the Grand Court in the 
Cayman Islands. Of the six judges in the Financial Services Division, only 
one judge is a Cayman Islands citizen.171 One of the Financial Division 
 
visited Apr. 12, 2020). The British Virgin Islands screens for these cases by requiring that “[t]he minimum 
value for a claim to be brought in the Commercial Court is US$500,000, although most cases are 
considerably larger than that.” See Supreme Court (High Court), GOV’T VIRGIN IS., 
http://www.bvi.gov.vg/supreme-court-high-court [https://perma.cc/VC57-HVB6]. Finally, claims arising 
out of the Bermuda Companies Act are required to be resolved by the Bermuda Commercial Court. See 
RULES OF THE SUPREME COURT 1985, Order 72/1 (Berm.), http://www.bermudalaws.bm/laws/ 
Consolidated%20Laws/Rules%20of%20the%20Supreme%20Court%201985.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/SA58-P9YY]. 
 168 APPLEBY, GUIDE TO THE LEGAL SYSTEM IN THE CAYMAN ISLANDS 4 (2015), 
https://www.applebyglobal.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/guide-to-the-legal-system-of-the-cayman-
islands.pdf [https://perma.cc/2JBV-J6T4] (“Civil cases before the Grand Court, by contrast, are often 
heard by judge alone unless the matter is one which can be heard by judge and jury (e.g. in cases of 
defamation).”); David Kessaram et al., Bermuda, in LITIGATION & DISPUTE RESOLUTION 24, 24 (Ted 
Greeno ed., 6th ed. 2017), https://www.globallegalinsights.com/practice-areas/litigation-and-dispute-
resolution-laws-and-regulations [https://perma.cc/246H-35WB] (“The judges in the Commercial Court 
are experienced in commercial matters and decide cases without a jury.”); Roe, Juries, supra note 160, at 
294 (“America’s premier corporate court—the Delaware Chancery court—sits without a jury . . . .”); 
Andrew Thorp et al., British Virgin Islands, in COMPLEX COMMERCIAL LITIGATION 19, 26 (Simon 
Bushnell & Daniel Spendlove eds., 2019) (available by subscription), 
https://gettingthedealthrough.com/area/102/jurisdiction/128/complex-commercial-litigation-british-
virgin-islands/ [https://perma.cc/5T6Q-YEQ9] (“Jury trials are not the norm and there is no provision for 
this mode of trial in the Commercial Court procedural rules. The BVI Commercial Court appoints single 
judges to perform the function of both tribunal of fact and law when determining the issues at trial.”). 
 169 See, e.g., Guy Manning et al., Cayman Islands, in DISPUTE RESOLUTION 2017, at 48 (Martin 
Davies & Kavan Bakhda eds., 2017) (available by subscription), 
https://gettingthedealthrough.com/area/9/jurisdiction/59/dispute-resolution-cayman-islands/ 
[https://perma.cc/2RDM-DKA6] (“[T]he selection process takes the form of a significant application 
form, shortlisting and interview.”). While commercial courts in offshore jurisdictions tend to be called 
“divisions” within courts that handle garden variety of criminal and civil cases, commercial cases are 
funneled into specialized divisions with judges with business law expertise, effectively constituting 
separate court systems. 
 170 Judicial Officers, DEL. CTS., https://courts.delaware.gov/chancery/judges.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/7YYS-A6D8\]. 
 171 Judges, CAYMAN IS. JUD. ADMIN., https://www.judicial.ky/judicial-administration/judges 
[https://perma.cc/N8CF-KKFX]; Margaret Ramsay-Hale Gets Top Judge Job in TCI, CAYMAN NEWS 
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judges in the Cayman Islands was also a partner in the London office of the 
renowned international law firm Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer LLP 
(Freshfields) and is now a barrister at a barristers’ chambers in London.172 
Another recently appointed judge in the same court is a former solicitor and 
partner at Freshfields and current associate at a barristers’ chambers located 
in London.173 In Bermuda, the Chief Justice has recently appointed nine 
“assistant justices,” a group of experienced commercial lawyers, who sit on 
the commercial court on an as-needed basis.174 
Although many court opinions are publicly available, and precedents 
do help contribute to filling gaps left in statutory language, offshore 
jurisdictions come nowhere close to the case law maintained by Delaware.175 
In contrast to Delaware’s judicial system, these jurisdictions also do not have 
every opinion available to the public. Of the three offshore jurisdictions, the 
Cayman Islands is most secretive. According to a recent report, 55% of cases 
litigated at the Financial Services Division of the Cayman Islands were 
sealed over a sixty-eight-day period.176 While unsealed opinions are 
published either in the Cayman Islands Law Reports or on the Cayman 
 
SERV. (June 20, 2014), http://archive.caymannewsservice.com/2014/06/20/margaret-ramsay-hale-gets-
top-judge-job-in-tci/ [https://perma.cc/KXP4-P45M]. 
 172 See Nick Segal, ERSKINE CHAMBERS, https://www.erskinechambers.com/barrister/nick-segal/ 
[https://perma.cc/8624-65KE]. 
 173 Raj Parker, MATRIX CHAMBERS, https://www.matrixlawinternational.com/wp-
content/uploads/2016/11/Raj-Parker-CV.pdf [https://perma.cc/8G5N-JN89]; Raj Parker CV, CT. 
INNOVATIVE ARB., coia.org/CV-Raj-Parker.PDF [https://perma.cc/3XGE-7GVX]. In the Cayman 
Islands, the judiciary also solicits applications for “part-time” judges for the Financial Division, who work 
an average of fifteen to twenty days per month. See Application for Acting Grant Court Judges, CAYMAN 
IS. GOV’T (2017), http://www.judicialandlegalservicescommission.ky/upimages/ckeditor/AD_GCJ-
FSD_January%202017.pdf [https://perma.cc/3PN5-ECGS]. 
 174 Most “assistant justices” are also fellows at the Chartered Institute of Arbitrators. GOV’T OF 
BERM., ASSISTANT JUSTICES’ PANEL-CIVIL AND COMMERCIAL (Sept. 28, 2017), 
https://www.gov.bm/sites/default/files/ASSISTANT%20JUSTICES%20PANEL.PDF 
[https://perma.cc/UL2A-TGUA]. 
 175 It is worth emphasizing that the secrecy element is not completely different from Delaware. In 
Delaware, although opinions are public, important rulings or insights into future rulings are made from 
the bench during trial and motion practice. See Mohsen Manesh, Dictum in Alternative Entity 
Jurisprudence and the Expansion of Judicial Power in Delaware, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON 
PARTNERSHIPS, LLCS AND ALTERNATIVE FORMS OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS 336, 350 (Robert W. 
Hillman & Mark J. Loewenstein eds., 2015) (“Transcript opinions, like dictum and the bench’s 
professional and scholarly engagement, have provided Delaware’s judges with alternative means by 
which to mold and refine the law, beyond the holdings of their written opinions.”). Although hearing 
transcripts are not public, law firms typically purchase them and use them as quasi-precedents. My thanks 
to Professor Romano for this point. 
 176 David Marchant, Cayman Court Secrecy on the Rise: 55% of Recent Financial Cases Are Sealed, 
OFFSHORE ALERT (Aug. 6, 2018), https://www.offshorealert.com/secrecy-at-financial-services-division-
grand-court-of-cayman-islands.aspx [https://perma.cc/DE6X-U6AV]. 
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Islands Judicial Administration’s website, full and unlimited access to the 
Cayman Islands Law Reports is available only to registered users who pay 
an annual fee.177 In Bermuda, the official government website publishes 
judicial opinions of commercial disputes, but many cases are adjudicated 
confidentially and not subject to public disclosure.178 Some British Virgin 
Islands opinions are available for a subscription fee,179 but the general rule is 
that in the British Virgin Islands, restricted access to court documents other 
than public summaries is not unusual.180 
The quasi-public nature of offshore judicial proceedings, which look a 
lot like modern commercial arbitration,181 helps these jurisdictions compete 
in the global corporate law market. Consider commercial cases resolved by 
the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) or the American Arbitration 
Association (AAA), two of the leading arbitration houses in the world. These 
arbitration houses resolve high-stakes commercial disputes through the 
consent of litigants.182 In 2017 alone, over one thousand cases were filed with 
the international division of the AAA.183 While some of the cases resolved in 
 
 177 See Cayman Islands Law Reports, CAYMAN IS. JUD. ADMIN., 
https://www.judicial.ky/judgments/cayman-islands-law-reports [https://perma.cc/93UL-SYCH]. In the 
Cayman Islands, proceedings are generally held either in open court or in the judge’s chambers. Most 
large commercial cases are held in open court, but some proceedings take place in the judge’s chambers, 
which are “generally considered to be private to the parties to the proceedings.” Dawson & Sherwood, 
supra note 167. 
 178 See Court Judgments, GOV’T BERM., https://www.gov.bm/court-judgments 
[https://perma.cc/C8ZZ-CQLZ]; Karen Skiffington, Finding the Law in Bermuda, GLOBALEX (Oct. 
2010), http://www.nyulawglobal.org/globalex/Bermuda.html [https://perma.cc/9YLH-F852]. 
 179 See The Largest Collection of Caribbean Case Law, JUSTIS, https://www.justis.com/caribbean/ 
[https://perma.cc/5CQD-R9AN]. 
 180 As the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit observed while adjudicating a claim that the 
“secret” nature of the British Virgin Islands proceedings is against U.S. public policy, “restricted access 
to court documents [other than public summaries] is not unusual in the BVI . . . because only certain 
limited records are typically available to non-parties.” In re Fairfield Sentry Ltd., 714 F.3d 127, 140 (2d 
Cir. 2013). 
 181 These features are not unique to offshore business courts. Professor Matthew Erie, for instance, 
documents the emergence of dispute resolution centers in Hong Kong, China, Singapore, Dubai, and 
Kazakhstan that are designed to “hook capital by attracting cross-border commercial disputes through a 
number of business models.” See Matthew S. Erie, The New Legal Hubs: The Emergent Landscape of 
International Commercial Dispute Resolution, 60 VA. J. INT’L L. (forthcoming 2020) (manuscript at 21) 
(on file with author). 
 182 MARGARET L. MOSES, THE PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL 
ARBITRATION 2 (3d ed. 2017) (“The parties’ consent provides the underpinning for the power of the 
arbitrators to decide the dispute.”). 
 183 AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, 2017 ANNUAL REPORT AND FINANCIAL STATEMENTS 20 (2018). 
Within these cases, the largest claimants stemmed from a diverse group of industries including 
“technology, commercial insurance, energy, aviation/aerospace/national security, pharmaceuticals, 
financial services and commercial construction.” Id. 
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arbitration end up getting published, albeit with significant retractions,184 
many of the cases remain unpublished.185 This feature helps, rather than 
impedes, arbitration houses compete with domestic courts as modern dispute 
resolution hubs.186 
Moreover, Delaware’s widely known advantages do not fully guard 
against competition from foreign nations because not every jurisdiction 
necessarily benefits from copying Delaware’s judicial system. Recall that 
Delaware’s corporate law “relies on open-ended standards applied by judges 
in ways that are highly case-specific.”187 This indeterminacy (1) enables 
Delaware to price discriminate annual incorporation fees;188 (2) increases 
demand for litigation, thus benefiting local corporate lawyers;189 and (3) 
deters potential competition from other states.190 
 
 184 See generally, e.g., 7 INT’L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, COLLECTION OF ICC ARBITRAL AWARDS, 
2012–2015 (Jean-Jacques Arnaldez, Yves Derains & Dominique Hascher eds., 2018); AAA YEARBOOK 
ON ARBITRATION & THE LAW xxiii (Stephen K. Huber & Ben H. Sheppard, Jr. eds., 25th ed. 2013); Award 
Made in Case No. 1512 (ICC 1971), reprinted in COLLECTION OF ICC ARBITRAL AWARDS, 1974–1985, 
at 3 (Sigvard Jarvin & Yves Derains eds., 1990). 
 185 Arbitral Awards & Court Decisions, GEO. L. LIBR., http://guides.ll.georgetown.edu/ 
c.php?g=363504&p=2455950 [https://perma.cc/WR5V-S35K] (“Locating a decision or award issued by 
an arbitral tribunal in an international commercial dispute is often an exercise in frustration. Many 
decisions and awards are not published . . . and some that are published have the names of the parties 
redacted.”). 
 186 See Ware, supra note 25, at 704–06 (discussing the extent to which the creation of law has been 
privatized through arbitration); Stephen J. Ware, Arbitration Under Assault: Trial Lawyers Lead the 
Charge, POL’Y ANALYSIS 1, 1 (2002), https://object.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa433.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/U4GC-YN4G] (“Arbitration is a private-sector alternative to the government court 
system. Compared with litigation, arbitration is typically quick, inexpensive, and confidential.”). 
 187 Bebchuk & Hamdani, Leisurely Walk, supra note 52, at 601; see also William T. Allen, Ambiguity 
in Corporation Law, 22 DEL. J. CORP. L. 894, 900 (1997); Fisch, Peculiar Role, supra note 23, at 1074 
(“Delaware corporate law relies on judicial lawmaking to a greater extent than other states.”). As 
Professor Rock explains, “the fact-specific, narrative quality of Delaware [judicial] opinions, over 
time . . . yield reasonably determinative guidelines.” Rock, Saints and Sinners, supra note 23, at 1017. 
 188 See Kahan & Kamar, Price Discrimination, supra note 133, at 1208. This is because Delaware’s 
vague corporate code induces the state to be a “litigation intensive” corporate law regime, generating a 
large body of case law. Firms and their shareholders are willing to pay more to opt into this legal regime. 
According to Professors Kahan and Kamar, “since Delaware offers by far the largest body of corporate 
law precedents, its law is more predictable than those of other states.” Id. at 1235. 
 189 See Macey & Miller, supra note 43, at 498 (“If the state were acting as a pure profit maximizer, 
it would attempt to minimize the indirect costs and maximize the direct costs of Delaware 
incorporation.”). 
 190 See Sean J. Griffith, Good Faith Business Judgment: A Theory of Rhetoric in Corporate Law 
Jurisprudence, 55 DUKE L.J. 1, 56 (2005) (“[J]udges may craft opinions to limit the risk of corporate 
migration . . . . [A]lthough a few reincorporations out of state do not represent a serious threat to the 
authority of the Delaware judiciary, large scale corporate migration poses a direct threat to Delaware 
courts as national corporate lawmakers. The judiciary therefore has a direct incentive to avoid opinions 
that would unleash a flood of corporate migration.”); Ehud Kamar, A Regulatory Competition Theory of 
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While Delaware counts on a large number of corporate litigants to 
reduce uncertainty associated with its vague statutory rules, foreign nations 
have enacted relatively clear-cut statutory laws.191 Far from being a death 
knell for competing in the market for corporate law, relatively clear statutory 
language may be attractive for certain firms that do not benefit from building 
extensive case law in a particular jurisdiction. Furthermore, a lack of an 
American-style discovery system and procedure may be attractive, at least 
for certain segments of the market, for the same reason certain consumers of 
Delaware corporate law are looking to resolve disputes in private arbitration 
rather than going to the Delaware Court of Chancery.192 
III. INTERNATIONAL MARKET FOR CORPORATE LAW AND THE FUTURE 
OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW 
This Part assesses the extent to which offshore corporate law havens 
offer differentiated corporate law “products” from American states and 
evaluates the normative desirability of the increasingly globalized market for 
corporate law. Section A documents offshore corporate law havens’ 
corporate governance rules that enable corporations to opt out of mandatory 
rules imposed by Delaware corporate law. Section B examines whether 
international corporate charter competition may be desirable from the 
perspective of society at large. While giving credence to the possibility that 
jurisdictional competition can benefit firms—and collectively, society at 
large—this Part identifies two countervailing considerations salient in the 
international context that render any claims about gains from jurisdictional 
competition premature at best. 
 
Indeterminacy in Corporate Law, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1908, 1911 (1998) (discussing the “competitive 
advantage” Delaware derives from network externalities). 
 191 Several competing theories might help explain this phenomenon. One reason why Delaware has 
gotten away with vague statutory laws is that it faces weak competition from other states. See Kahan & 
Kamar, Myth, supra note 28. Another plausible explanation is that foreign nations, unlike Delaware, do 
not fear the federalization of American corporate law and are thus able to devise corporate law statutes 
without intervention from Washington, D.C. As Professors Bebchuk and Hamdani explain, “[T]he 
flexibility of the open-ended standards enables Delaware case law to develop in directions that are 
responsive to the fear of federal intervention without the visible change in course that would be involved 
in a legislative amendment.” Bebchuk & Hamdani, Leisurely Walk, supra note 52, at 603. 
 192 See Lynn M. LoPucki, Delaware’s Fall: The Arbitration Bylaws Scenario, in CAN DELAWARE 
BE DETHRONED? 35, 50 (Stephen Bainbridge et al. eds., 2018) (commenting on the potential emergence 
of arbitration in corporate charters that force shareholders to arbitration); Zachary D. Clopton & Verity 
Winship, A Cooperative Federalism Approach to Shareholder Arbitration, 128 YALE L.J. F. 169, 170–
71 (2018) (“The consequences of a shift to shareholder arbitration could be substantial . . . . A shift to 
arbitration likely would dramatically reduce the number of claims filed, in part because representative 
actions such as class actions or derivative suits probably would be unavailable. The future of shareholder 
rights may be at stake.” (footnote omitted)). 
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A. Lax Laws Offshore? 
American corporate law is predominantly conceptualized as default 
rules that firms can opt out of through contract.193 But there are a few 
mandatory rules under state corporate law that even sophisticated parties 
cannot waive through contract.194 These rules principally govern the power 
structure between shareholders and managers of corporations.195 
Importantly, a survey of key corporate governance rules offered by 
leading foreign jurisdictions reveals distinctive templates of corporate codes 
that allow corporations to opt out of rules that are mandatory in the pure 
domestic context.196 These include (1) limitations on shareholder derivative 
lawsuits; (2) restrictions on shareholders inspecting books and records of 
corporations; and (3) lax fiduciary duty rules that allow corporations to opt 
out of rules that are mandatory in the United States.197 These features are 
highlighted below. 
 
 193 See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 8, at 2 (“The corporate code in almost every state is an 
‘enabling’ statute. An enabling statute allows managers and investors to write their own tickets, to 
establish systems of governance without substantive scrutiny from a regulator.”); Jens Dammann, The 
Mandatory Law Puzzle: Redefining American Exceptionalism in Corporate Law, 65 HASTINGS L.J. 441, 
441 (2014) (“Corporate law in the United States is largely enabling, whereas most other countries around 
the globe rely heavily on mandatory corporate law.”). 
 194 See Christopher M. Bruner, Opting Out of Fiduciary Duties and Liabilities in U.S. and U.K. 
Business Entities, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON FIDUCIARY LAW 285, 289 (D. Gordon Smith & Andrew 
S. Gold eds., 2018). 
 195 See Jens Dammann, Homogeneity Effects in Corporate Law, 46 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1103, 1134 (2014) 
(“[M]any of the norms that govern the distribution of power between shareholders and the board of a 
public corporation retain their mandatory character.”). 
 196 I want to be clear here that not all offshore jurisdictions pursue the strategy of offering 
differentiated corporate governance rules. Corporate law of the Marshall Islands, for instance, is largely 
modeled after Delaware corporate law. The Marshall Islands Business Corporations Act specifically 
instructs that the law be “applied and construed to make the laws of the Republic . . . uniform with the 
laws of the State of Delaware.” 52 M.I.R.C., Part I, § 13 (2004) (Marsh. Is.). 
 197 These rules are illustrative and not exhaustive. For instance, offshore corporate law also enables 
domestic corporations to opt out of shareholder appraisal rights, which is guaranteed in every state in the 
United States. Albert H. Choi & Eric Talley, Appraising the “Merger Price” Appraisal Rule, 34 J.L. 
ECON. & ORG. 543, 543 (2018) (“In mergers and acquisitions law, shareholders of a target company often 
enjoy a statutory right to reject the terms of an approved sale in favor of a judicial determination of ‘fair 
value’ for their shares. All states provide dissenters with some form of appraisal right . . . .”). Some 
offshore companies are upfront about the lack of minority shareholder protection. Houston-based Vantage 
Drilling Company, for instance, discloses in its SEC filing the effect of its status as a Cayman Islands 
company: If “a takeover offer . . . is approved, any dissenting shareholder would have no rights 
comparable to appraisal rights, which would otherwise ordinarily be available to dissenting shareholders 
of United States corporations, providing rights to receive payment in cash for the judicially determined 
value of the shares.” Vantage Drilling Company, Registration of Certain Classes of Securities (Form 8-
A/A) 6 (Jan. 14, 2010). 
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1. Derivative Suits 
Derivative suits, which date back to the early nineteenth century in the 
United States,198 are typically shareholder claims against corporate insiders 
for mismanagement.199 These claims have long been available under every 
American state’s corporate law.200 Under Delaware law, a shareholder is 
eligible to bring a derivative action if she demands the board of directors to 
assert the claims or offers particular reasons why making such a demand 
would be futile.201 Successful derivative suits are paid to the corporation, 
theoretically enhancing the value of the stock and assets of the corporation 
for all current shareholders.202 While the desirability of a liberal derivative 
suit regime is disputed—after all, defending frivolous suits is costly203—the 
general availability of derivative suits purportedly serves to compensate 
injured shareholders while deterring managerial misconduct.204 
Offshore corporate law havens have vastly restricted the possibility of 
derivative suits.205 In the British Virgin Islands, shareholders must first seek 
permission from the court prior to bringing a derivative suit.206 Even if the 
court grants their request,207 the remedy may require the company to acquire 
the shareholders’ shares.208 In the Cayman Islands, derivative suits similarly 
require permission from the court to proceed, and the practical success rate 
is slim. As practitioners from one prominent law firm explain, “[n]ot only is 
 
 198 The earliest shareholder suit in the United States was brought in 1832. See DEBORAH A. DEMOTT, 
SHAREHOLDER DERIVATIVE ACTIONS: LAW AND PRACTICE 11 (2018) (citing Robinson v. Smith, 3 Paige 
Ch. 222 (N.Y. Ch. 1832)). 
 199 See George S. Geis, Shareholder Derivative Litigation and the Preclusion Problem, 100 VA. L. 
REV. 261, 268 (2014). 
 200 See Erickson, supra note 30, at 122. 
 201 See Dennis J. Block, Stephen A. Radin & Michael J. Maimone, Derivative Litigation: Current 
Law Versus the American Law Institute, 48 BUS. LAW. 1443, 1451 (1992); John H. Matheson, Restoring 
the Promise of the Shareholder Derivative Suit, 50 GA. L. REV. 327, 359–60 (2016). 
 202 See Geis, supra note 199, at 268–71. 
 203 See Erickson, supra note 30, at 86; Mark J. Loewenstein, Shareholder Derivative Litigation and 
Corporate Governance, 24 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 5–6 (1999). 
 204 Swanson, supra note 30, at 1345–46. 
 205 Of course, only time will tell if these jurisdictions will continue to maintain rules that are hostile 
to derivative suits. 
 206 Statutory provisions on derivative actions have been enacted in the BVI Business Companies Act, 
2004, §§ 184C–184F (Virgin Is.). 
 207 The British Virgin Islands law enumerates the list of factors judges must consider in deciding 
whether to grant a leave: “(a) whether the member is acting in good faith; (b) whether the derivative 
action is in the interests of the company taking account of the views of the company’s directors on 
commercial matters; (c) whether the proceedings are likely to succeed; (d) the costs of the proceedings in 
relation to the relief likely to be obtained; and (e) whether an alternative remedy to the derivative claim 
is available.” BVI Business Companies Act, 2004, § 184C (Virgin Is.). 
 208 Id. § 184I. 
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the threshold for such claims quite high (including the requirement to prove 
self-dealing or wrongful benefit), but the likely remedies available may be 
limited[.] [F]or example there is no ability to recover damages for mere 
negligence, or to claw back preferential or fraudulently undervalued 
transfers.”209 While Bermuda did not previously have a statutory framework 
on derivative suits, it amended its rules in 2018 to require derivative suits to 
seek leave from the court, thereby bringing its rules close to those of the 
Cayman Islands and the British Virgin Islands.210 
Some corporations are upfront about the content of offshore corporate 
laws in their public disclosures. For example, New York fashion house 
Michael Kors, which incorporated in the British Virgin Islands before listing 
in the New York Stock Exchange in 2011, disclosed in its annual reports: 
“The laws of the British Virgin Islands provide limited protection for 
minority shareholders, so minority shareholders will have limited or no 
recourse if they are dissatisfied with the conduct of our affairs.”211 Likewise, 
the public disclosures of Herbalife, which is headquartered in Los Angeles 
and incorporated in the Cayman Islands, explain: “Our Cayman Islands 
counsel, Maples and Calder, is not aware of any reported decisions in relation 
to a derivative action brought in a Cayman Islands court.”212 Incorporation 
choices of these “offshore” companies have serious consequences for 
American investors. In several cases, federal and state judges have dismissed 
multibillion-dollar suits brought by domestic shareholders of American 
firms incorporated in offshore jurisdictions, despite plaintiffs bringing the 
cases in the United States.213 
2. Inspection of Corporate Books and Records 
Derived from common law, all fifty states and the District of Columbia 
currently require corporations to provide shareholders qualified access to 
corporate books and records by statute.214 This right, which is one of the few 
 
 209 MOURANT, BREACH OF DUTY BY DIRECTOR OF A CAYMAN FUND – THE PATH TO INVESTOR 
RELIEF IN THE CAYMAN ISLANDS VS NEW YORK 4 (2017), https://www.mourant.com/file-library/media–
–2016/2016-guides/breach-of-duty-by-director-of-a-cayman-fund.pdf [https://perma.cc/7VUY-22MM]. 
 210 Bermuda RSC Amended to Require Leave to Bring Derivative Actions, APPLEBY (Sept. 20, 2018), 
https://www.applebyglobal.com/publications/bermuda-rsc-amended-to-require-leave-to-bring-
derivative-actions/ [https://perma.cc/ESM7-QAD6]. 
 211 Michael Kors Holdings Ltd., Registration Statement (Form F-3) 8 (Feb. 19, 2013). 
 212 Herbalife Ltd., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 41–42 (Feb. 19, 2013). 
 213 See, e.g., Winn v. Schafer, 499 F. Supp. 2d 390, 392 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (dismissing a derivative 
suit brought by a shareholder of a reinsurance company incorporated in the Cayman Islands). 
 214 Browning Jeffries, Shareholder Access to Corporate Books and Records: The Abrogation 
Debate, 59 DRAKE L. REV. 1087, 1088 (2011). 
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rights bestowed on individual shareholders,215 is deemed critical because of 
the basic agency problem that arises in large corporations: managers who run 
the corporations have better information than dispersed shareholders who 
technically own the corporations.216 Under Delaware law, shareholder 
requests for inspections are granted when there is a “proper purpose.”217 
Delaware courts have zealously guarded this right.218 Thus, for instance, in a 
recent case, the Delaware Court of Chancery held that a proper purpose for 
inspection may include “possible derivative litigation” or even seeking “an 
audience with the board to discuss reforms or, failing in that, they may 
prepare a stockholder resolution for the next annual meeting, or mount a 
proxy fight to elect new directors.”219 
Books and records inspections are uniformly forbidden under the laws 
of offshore corporate law havens. An SEC disclosure of a multinational solar 
power producer incorporated in the Cayman Islands best captures the state 
of Cayman Islands law: 
Shareholders of Cayman Islands exempted companies such as ourselves have 
no general rights under Cayman Islands law to inspect corporate records and 
accounts or to obtain copies of lists of shareholders of these companies . . . . 
This may make it more difficult for you to obtain the information needed to 
establish any facts necessary for a shareholder motion or to solicit proxies from 
other shareholders in connection with a proxy contest.220 
 
 215 See Marcel Kahan, Rethinking Corporate Bonds: The Trade-Off Between Individual and 
Collective Rights, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1040, 1042 & n.6 (2002). 
 216 Books and records inspections can thus aid potential investigations for corporate wrongdoing, 
help mount a proxy fight, or assist in preparing a stockholder resolution. See Samuel L. Moultrie & 
Andrea Schoch Brooks, Delaware Insider: Defining a Proper Purpose for Books and Records Actions in 
Delaware, 2015 BUS. L. TODAY 1 (2015); F. Hodge O’Neal, Oppression of Minority Shareholders: 
Protecting Minority Rights, 35 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 121, 139 (1987). 
 217 See, e.g., Se. Pa. Transp. Auth. v. Abbvie Inc., 2015 WL 1753033, at *11 (Del. Ch. Apr. 15, 
2015). 
 218 Thus, according to a recent Delaware Chancery Court opinion, “[i]t is well established that 
investigation of potential corporate wrongdoing is a proper purpose for a Section 220 books and records 
inspection.” Id. 
 219 Graulich v. Dell Inc., 2011 WL 1843813, at *5 (Del. Ch. May 16, 2011). 
 220 Sky Solar Holdings, Ltd., Annual Report (Form 20-F) 34 (May 2, 2016); see also Vantage 
Drilling Co., Registration of Certain Classes of Securities (Form 8-A/A) 7 (Jan. 14, 2010) (“Holders of 
the Ordinary Shares will have no general right under Cayman Islands law to inspect or obtain copies of 
the Company’s list of shareholders or its corporate records (other than the Amended and Restated 
Memorandum and Articles of Association).”). 
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The British Virgin Islands and Bermuda similarly allow corporations to 
forbid their shareholders to inspect books and records, either outright or 
through various procedural hurdles.221 
3. Fiduciary Duties of Directors and Officers 
Among the most canonical mandatory rules in American corporate law 
include the fiduciary duty owed by directors and officers (agents) to 
shareholders (principal). These duties are unsurprising, given that dispersed 
shareholders need a mechanism to ensure that people who operate their 
companies do not abuse their powers. Fiduciary duties can be largely divided 
into two duties: the duty of care and the duty of loyalty. The duty of care 
imposes liability if directors exercise business judgment without first being 
adequately informed, while the duty of loyalty prohibits directors from 
improperly benefiting through conflicts of interest.222 Despite loosening 
monetary exposures on duty of care personal liability of directors,223 
Delaware mandates this duty upon officers—like chief executive officers—
who operate the corporation on a daily basis. Furthermore, a Delaware 
corporation cannot waive “any breach of the director’s duty of loyalty to the 
corporation or its stockholders” for “acts or omissions not in good faith or 
which involve intentional misconduct or a knowing violation of law” or “any 
transaction from which the director derived an improper personal benefit.”224 
By incorporating in one of the leading offshore jurisdictions, domestic 
corporations can opt out of fiduciary duties that have long been considered 
axiomatic features of American corporate law. Here, we see diverging 
approaches among offshore jurisdictions. Whereas the Cayman Islands and 
 
 221 Joshua Mangeot, British Virgin Islands: Shareholder Activism – Considerations for BVI 
Companies, MONDAQ (July 31, 2017), http://www.mondaq.com/x/615488/Shareholders/ 
Shareholder+Activism+Considerations+For+BVI+Companies [https://perma.cc/98XT-DUJA] 
(“[S]ubject to the company’s M&As, the directors [of a BVI corporation] may refuse or limit access if 
they are satisfied that inspection would be contrary to the company’s interests. While it is possible to 
apply to court to seek access in such cases, this is a relatively costly process and the court may be reluctant 
to make an order permitting inspection provided the directors can evidence bona fide commercial 
justifications for restricting access.”); Everest Re Grp., Ltd., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 36 (2017) 
(“Bermuda law does not provide a general right for shareholders to inspect or obtain copies of any other 
corporate records.”). 
 222 Gabriel Rauterberg & Eric Talley, Contracting Out of the Fiduciary Duty of Loyalty: An 
Empirical Analysis of Corporate Opportunity Waivers, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 1075, 1084–85 (2017). 
 223 See Randy J. Holland, Delaware Directors’ Fiduciary Duties: The Focus on Loyalty, 11 U. PA. 
J. BUS. L. 675, 696 (2009) (explaining that under Delaware law, firms can contractually “exculpate their 
directors from monetary damage liability for a breach of the duty of care”); see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 
8, § 102(b)(7) (West 2019) (specifying that corporations incorporated in Delaware may include a 
provision “eliminating or limiting the personal liability of a director to the corporation or its stockholders 
for monetary damages” for duty of care violations). 
 224 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7). 
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the British Virgin Islands appear to have adopted similar mandatory rules as 
Delaware,225 Bermuda stands unique in allowing corporations to waive all 
fiduciary duty claims against directors and officers except in events of fraud 
or dishonesty.226 Indeed, as an SEC disclosure form of a biopharmaceutical 
company incorporated in Bermuda makes clear: “as permitted by Bermuda 
law, each shareholder has waived any claim or right of action against our 
directors or officers for any action taken by directors or officers in the 
performance of their duties, except for actions involving fraud or 
dishonesty.”227 
These waivers would not be enforceable under Delaware law. While 
Delaware has recently enacted a revision to its statute that has narrowed the 
scope of its fiduciary duty laws,228 the duty of loyalty still affords several 
ways shareholders can bring fiduciary suits to hold officers and directors 
accountable. As explained in the famous Delaware Supreme Court decision 
In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litigation, these suits are available 
where the fiduciary intentionally acts with a purpose other than that of 
advancing the best interests of the corporation, where the fiduciary acts with the 
intent to violate applicable positive law, or where the fiduciary intentionally 
fails to act in the face of a known duty to act, demonstrating a conscious 
disregard for his duties.229 
 
*          *          * 
 
Taken together, restrictions on shareholder derivative suits, 
prohibitions on shareholders’ books and records inspections, and loosened 
fiduciary duties may be an indication that managers are attempting to draw 
 
 225 See APPLEBY, GUIDE TO DIRECTORS’ DUTIES IN THE CAYMAN ISLANDS 5–6 (2015) [hereinafter 
APPLEBY, GUIDE]; WALKERS, BRITISH VIRGIN ISLANDS – DUTIES AND LIABILITIES OF DIRECTORS OF 
BVI COMPANIES 3–4 (2016). 
 226 Bermuda Companies Act of 1981, § 98(1)–(2) (Berm.) (“[A] company may in its [bylaws] or in 
any contract or arrangement between the company and any officer, or any person employed by the 
company as auditor, exempt such officer or person from, or indemnify him in respect of, any loss arising 
or liability attaching to him by virtue of any rule of law in respect of any negligence, default, breach of 
duty or breach of trust of which the officer or person may be guilty in relation to the company or any 
subsidiary thereof . . . . Any provision . . . exempting such officer or person from, or indemnifying him 
against any liability which by virtue of any rule of law would otherwise attach to him in respect of any 
fraud or dishonesty of which he may be guilty in relation to the company shall be void . . . .”). 
 227 Axovant Scis. Ltd., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q) 44 (June 30, 2015). 
 228 Rauterberg & Talley, supra note 222, at 1077–78 (describing Delaware corporate law allowing 
the waiver of rules that forbid “corporate fiduciaries from appropriating new business prospects for 
themselves without first offering them to the company”). 
 229 906 A.2d 27, 67 (Del. 2006). 
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rent at the expense of shareholders. This is the traditional race for the bottom 
story. But lax rules are not inconsistent with a race for the top story. A 
benevolent explanation may be that the lack of mandatory rules benefits both 
managers and shareholders by deterring frivolous lawsuits. After all, modern 
shareholders of publicly traded corporations include sophisticated 
institutional investors like BlackRock or The Vanguard Group230 that 
presumably would choose not to invest in firms incorporated in foreign 
nations if they could not sufficiently protect their self-interest. The next 
Section fleshes out the normative dimensions of this new descriptive reality. 
B. Implications: Reassessing the Market for Corporate Law 
The foregoing analysis yields several new insights that make the 
international market for corporate law an area for future research.231 My goal 
in this Section is to resist the temptation to draw sweeping normative 
conclusions and instead to offer some preliminary assessments that may 
prescribe a research agenda for the next several decades. Thus, I will 
highlight areas where the globalizing market for corporate law forces us to 
rethink prevailing assumptions and methods. 
To begin, the emergence of an international market for corporate law 
may improve the robustness of competition between jurisdictions to supply 
 
 230 See DAVID WEBBER, THE RISE OF THE WORKING-CLASS SHAREHOLDER: LABOR’S LAST BEST 
WEAPON 84 (2018); Scott Hirst, The Case for Investor Ordering, 8 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 227, 241–42 
(2018) (“[T]he nature of corporate investment has been transformed by the rise of institutional investors. 
Retirement savings have shifted to the equity markets, and from direct investment to investment 
intermediated by institutional investors. The great majority of U.S. corporations now have most of their 
outstanding shares held by institutional investors.” (citations omitted)); Edward B. Rock, The Logic and 
(Uncertain) Significance of Institutional Shareholder Activism, 79 GEO. L.J. 445 (1991) (documenting 
and analyzing the rise of institutional ownership of publicly traded American corporations). 
 231 One area ripe for future research is to model the type of domestic companies that are incorporating 
in foreign nations. Following Professor Barzuza’s important work documenting the rise of Nevada as a 
“liability-free” jurisdiction, scholars have produced empirical evidence that Nevada principally attracts 
small firms. In an important study, Professors Ofer Eldar and Lorenzo Magnolfi found that Delaware 
attracts large firms with sizeable institutional investor holdings compared to Nevada, lending support to 
the idea most firms “dislike protectionist laws, such as anti-takeover statutes and liability protections for 
officers, and that Nevada’s rise is due to the preferences of small firms.” Ofer Eldar & Lorenzo Magnolfi, 
Regulatory Competition and the Market for Corporate Law, 11 AM. ECON. J.: MICROECONOMICS 
(forthcoming 2020) (manuscript at 1), https://papers.ssrn.com/a=2685969 [https://perma.cc/58WJ-
JHBF]. A similar line of empirical research is needed for understanding why domestic corporations are 
opting into the corporate law of foreign nations despite Delaware’s longstanding dominance. Another 
topic that may be worth investigating is whether and to what extent legal representation influences 
incorporation decisions of firms choosing between popular offshore jurisdictions. In the domestic context, 
the choice of legal representation has been found to be an important variable in incorporation decisions. 
See Robert Anderson IV, The Delaware Trap: An Empirical Analysis of Incorporation Decisions, 91 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 657, 662 (2018) (finding that the identity of a company’s law firm, then the legal needs of 
a company, may drive jurisdictional choice). 
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corporate law. Recall an important work by Professors Kahan and Kamar 
that calls the very notion that American states compete for corporate charters 
a “myth.”232 According to their account, no state besides Delaware is actively 
attempting to attract incorporations of public companies.233 Their study sent 
shockwaves through the legal academy at the time of its publication because 
competition between suppliers of corporate law is a precondition to drawing 
some of the most important normative conclusions in corporate law.234 This 
study reorients this literature. Even if we were to believe that the interstate 
competition is a “myth,”235 there are still jurisdictions—namely a handful of 
entrepreneurial foreign nations—that are actively competing to gain a share 
of Delaware’s lucrative corporate law empire. 
At least in theory, the additional players in the corporate charter race 
promise welfare gains by enabling optimal private choice. As in any market, 
consumers (here, corporations) gain access to a higher number of sellers 
(here, jurisdictions) and promise efficient, welfare-enhancing transactions.236 
This is particularly true if one adopts a nexus of contracts approach to 
corporate law—viewing corporate law as standard form default rules that 
happen to be produced by sovereign entities.237 More “laboratories” 
producing corporate law will, in some cases, also lead to the diffusion of 
beneficial corporate law innovations across jurisdictions.238 
The emerging international corporate law market is thus reason for 
celebration to those committed to the “race for the top” view.239 A few 
decades ago, Judge Winter of the Second Circuit lamented that the corporate 
charter competition may be more of a “leisurely walk” than a “race” because 
Delaware “is the only state devoted exclusively to maximizing franchise 
taxes and may need only to offer a code marginally more efficient than other 
 
 232 Kahan & Kamar, Myth, supra note 28, at 679. 
 233 Id. at 684. 
 234 Id. at 681. 
 235 Id. at 679. 
 236 A simple analogy may be useful to illustrate this point. Imagine that I am an avid consumer of 
fast food. Instead of being limited to purchasing the Big Mac at McDonald’s, if I can choose the Junior 
Bacon Cheeseburger at Wendy’s or the Whopper at Burger King, my happiness (or in economics 
terminology, welfare) is enhanced. This is particularly true when competition encourages suppliers to 
offer better (or innovative) products. 
 237 See Easterbrook & Fischel, The Corporate Contract, supra note 38, at 1426. 
 238 The diffusion of LLCs across the United States that started with Wyoming is one example. 
William J. Carney, Limited Liability Companies: Origins and Antecedents, 66 U. COLO. L. REV. 855, 
857–59 (1995). 
 239 This includes Judge Easterbook and Professor Fischel, who assessed in their influential book that 
fifty states are “perhaps too few to offer the complete menu of terms needed for the thousands of different 
corporate ventures.” EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 8, at 216. 
 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
1452 
states.”240 It is for this reason Judge Winter concluded that what may be 
needed to improve American corporate law is “a second Delaware that 
pursues franchise taxes and nothing else.”241 Instead of the second state that 
Judge Winter may have wished for, it appears that there are other nations 
emerging as Delaware’s competition. 
The fact that lawmakers in small foreign nations are easily “captured” 
by the private sector, in certain respects, merely indicates lowered 
transactional costs of producing desirable “off-the-rack” templates of 
corporate law.242 Thus, unlike domestic jurisdictions, where the large and 
dispersed nature of constituents make it prohibitively expensive to produce 
certain types of laws, “captured” lawmakers can swiftly enact legislative 
reforms that reflect private sector preferences almost in real time.243 
Indeed, one benevolent explanation for the emergence of offshore 
corporate law havens is that they cater to corporations that want to hedge 
against frivolous lawsuits. There is some evidence of this practice. For 
instance, the rules in the Cayman Islands considerably limiting the 
possibility of shareholder derivative suits have been described as aiming to 
protect corporations from “vexatious or unfounded litigation.”244 Moreover, 
the Cayman Islands and the British Virgin Islands, unlike Bermuda, have 
adopted fiduciary duty rules similar to Delaware’s instead of enacting rules 
that eviscerate fiduciary duties altogether.245 This suggests that even pure 
private ordering does not necessarily result in the kind of managerial-
interests-gone-wild scenario predicted by early “race for the bottom” 
theorists.246 
 
 240 Ralph K. Winter, The “Race for the Top” Revisited: A Comment on Eisenberg, 89 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1526, 1529 (1989). 
 241 Id. 
 242 See William T. Allen, Contracts and Communities in Corporation Law, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 
1395, 1400 (1993). 
 243 As Professor Henry Hansmann explains, publicly traded firms rely on legislatures to adjust the 
parties’ contract over time as circumstances demand. See Henry Hansmann, Corporation and Contract, 
8 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 1, 8–10 (2006). 
 244 Renova Res. Private Equity Ltd. v. Gilbertson [2009] CILR 268, 283. 
 245 See APPLEBY, GUIDE, supra note 225, at 9 (stating that Cayman law allows for indemnification 
of both a company’s directors and officers against personal liability stemming from actions that involve 
the company’s business while still maintaining the “irreducible core” of a fiduciary’s obligations). 
 246 See Cary, supra note 44, at 705 (“The absurdity of this race for the bottom, with Delaware in the 
lead—tolerated and indeed fostered by corporate counsel—should arrest the conscience of the American 
bar when its current reputation is in low estate.” (footnote omitted)). Indeed, not all restrictions on 
traditional shareholder rights can necessarily be explained away as a race for the bottom phenomenon. 
For instance, there is early empirical evidence that lax governance rules in Nevada (a jurisdiction that is 
said to have adopted a “bottom feeder” strategy to attract corporations) actually increases—rather than 
decreases—shareholder value. See Ofer Eldar, Can Lax Corporate Law Increase Shareholder Value? 
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It does not seem like shareholders are actively hostile to lax rules 
offered in foreign nations, either.247 In 2011, for instance, New York fashion 
house Michael Kors went public on the New York Stock Exchange choosing 
British Virgin Islands corporate law and raised nearly four billion dollars.248 
Opting out of American courts also means avoiding certain American 
discovery procedures that can be unduly expensive.249 This account seems to 
be supported in part by the arbitration-like dispute resolution mechanism 
offered by specialized business courts offshore.250 
But if one takes a broader conception of corporate governance rules—
a view that may accommodate concerns that corporate law may impact third 
parties or society at large—the emergence of additional players in the 
corporate charter race may have a range of consequences that may be 
undesirable from a societal standpoint.251 In the international context, there 
are several unique reasons why we cannot take an expanded selection of 
corporate law as necessarily promising socially desirable outcomes. First is 
 
Evidence from Nevada, 61 J.L. & ECON. 555, 597 (2018) (presenting empirical evidence that Nevada 
corporate law does not harm shareholder value—and may enhance the value—particularly for small firms 
with low institutional shareholding and high insider ownership). 
 247 It bears noting that institutional owners hold a significant percentage of shares for many of these 
firms. As of March 7, 2020, for instance, institutional owners held over 95% of Helen of Troy (a consumer 
products company headquartered in El Paso, Texas, and incorporated in Bermuda), with BlackRock, 
FMR, Vanguard, and Capital Research Global Investors holding the highest number of shares. Helen of 
Troy Limited Common Stock (HELE) Institutional Holdings, NASDAQ, https://www.nasdaq.com/market-
activity/stocks/hele/institutional-holdings [https://perma.cc/6V37-WQYU]. 
 248 See Steven Davidoff Solomon, The Benefits of Incorporating Abroad in an Age of Globalization, 
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 20, 2011, 3:53 PM), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/12/20/the-benefits-of-
incorporating-abroad-in-an-age-of-globalization/ [https://perma.cc/6754-GZGX]. 
 249 See Erica Gorga & Michael Halberstam, Litigation Discovery and Corporate Governance: The 
Missing Story About the “Genius of American Corporate Law”, 63 EMORY L.J. 1383, 1482 (2014) 
(observing that discovery in American shareholder lawsuits is “not merely expensive; it subjects the 
actions of the directors and officers, as well as the behavior of all company employees, to a level of 
scrutiny that is virtually nonexistent in any other country”); see also Seth Katsuya Endo, Discovery 
Hydraulics, 52 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1317, 1339 (2019) (“The perception that excessive document 
discovery [in the United States] commonly leads to expensive and lengthy litigation processes is 
widespread . . . .”). 
 250 These features are not unique to offshore business law courts. Professor Pam Bookman, for 
instance, observed that emerging international commercial courts around the world are becoming more 
“arbitrationalized,” borrowing some of arbitration’s most attractive features, including expert 
adjudicators and confidentiality. See Pamela K. Bookman, The Adjudication Business, 45 YALE J. INT’L 
L. (forthcoming 2020). 
 251 Of course, not everyone will agree that corporate law creates externalities. See, e.g., Easterbrook 
& Fischel, The Corporate Contract, supra note 38, at 1429–30 (“The corporation’s choice of governance 
mechanisms does not create substantial third-party effects—that is, does not injure persons who are not 
voluntary participants in the venture.”); see also Kevin V. Tu, Socially Conscious Corporations and 
Shareholder Profit, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 121, 131 (2016) (observing the “divergence of opinion as to 
whether the corporation ought to be viewed as purely private or, alternatively, as a social institution”). 
 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
1454 
the ubiquity of tax. While incorporation decisions cannot purely be explained 
as a problem of tax arbitrage,252 current tax laws do allow corporations to 
reduce tax liability by incorporating outside of the United States.253 
Incorporation decisions in the pure domestic context generally do not 
implicate a substantial altering of effective tax liability because actual 
territorial operations—as opposed to the place of incorporation—determine 
state income taxes.254 Consider, for instance, an automobile manufacturer 
headquartered in Michigan. The company’s decision to incorporate in 
Nevada or Delaware will have no bearing on state income taxes, for 
Michigan, like other states, imposes taxes based on whether sufficient 
activity occurs within its borders. It will also not affect federal taxes because 
firms operating within the United States must pay federal taxes. The 
company deciding to incorporate in the Cayman Islands, on the other hand, 
will have dramatic federal tax implications.255 This is because “under the 
Internal Revenue Code (IRC) corporate tax-residence is determined based 
on the place of incorporation.”256 For instance, Houston-headquartered 
Cooper Industries, Inc. moved its place of incorporation from Ohio to 
Bermuda, touting that it would “reduce its effective tax rate from about 35% 
to 18–23%.”257 To the extent that firms can continue to alter their effective 
tax liability by incorporating in foreign jurisdictions, U.S. taxpayers are the 
big third parties negatively affected by incorporation decisions of private 
corporations. 
To be sure, overall welfare effects of transnational corporate tax 
arbitrage can be disputed. This is because corporations, as entities of legal 
fiction, do not actually pay taxes—any tax on a corporate entity is passed 
through to its shareholders, employees, customers, and suppliers.258 The 
 
 252 See supra Section II.A; see also Darren Rosenblum, The Futility of Walls: How Traveling 
Corporations Threaten State Sovereignty, 93 TUL. L. REV. 645, 645 (2019) (“Inversions—mergers in 
which one firm merges with another abroad to avoid taxes in its home country—have spread as 
globalization has reduced many of the transactional costs associated with relocating.”). 
 253 See Marian, supra note 61, at 2–3. 
 254 Moon, Tax Havens, supra note 108, at 1093–94. 
 255 See id. 
 256 Marian, supra note 61, at 3. 
 257 Cathy Hwang, The New Corporate Migration: Tax Diversion Through Inversion, 80 BROOK. L. 
REV. 807, 827 (2015) (citing Cooper Indus., Ltd., Registration Statement (Form S-4) 13–14 (June 11, 
2001)). 
 258 See Kimberly A. Clausing, The Future of the Corporate Tax, 66 TAX L. REV. 419, 419–23 (2013); 
Michael P. Donohoe et al., Who Benefits from the Tax Advantages of Organizational Form Choice?, 68 
NAT’L TAX J. 975, 976 (2015) (investigating “whether and to what extent four parties—customers, 
suppliers, employees, and owners—benefit from the relative tax advantages of organizational form 
choice”). 
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incidence of the corporate tax has been extensively studied by economists, 
who are inconclusive about where it falls.259 But we do know with a 
reasonable degree of certainty that it does not fall solely on shareholders.260 
Thus, lower corporate taxes from a corporation headquartered in the United 
States reincorporating abroad might in fact benefit the corporation’s 
employees and customers by reducing how much of that tax they bear in 
lower salaries and higher prices.261 I am skeptical, though, whether this form 
of tax savings can legitimately replace the function of tax revenues that are 
the lifeblood of democratic governments.262 
Second, foreign jurisdictions may enable domestic corporations to opt 
out of desirable mandatory rules that benefit society in general. The fact that 
firms can opt out of mandatory rules using “captured” foreign lawmakers 
should warrant further scholarly scrutiny, for “the mandatory nature of a law 
is an indicator, and is perhaps the best evidence, that the law addresses 
externalities in the private sector.”263 In a classic piece widely considered to 
be the most serious challenge to the “race for the top” account, Professor 
Lucian Bebchuk argued that even if shareholders’ interests perfectly align 
with those of managers,264 we cannot assume that state charter competition 
leads to socially desirable results.265 This is because of the presence of 
externalities, or impact on third parties. Therefore, the rules that maximize 
 
 259 See Arnold C. Harberger, Corporate Tax Incidence: Reflections on What Is Known, Unknown, 
and Unknowable, in FUNDAMENTAL TAX REFORM: ISSUES, CHOICES, AND IMPLICATIONS 283, 283 (John 
W. Diamond & George R. Zodrow eds., 2008). 
 260 See Alan J. Auerbach, Who Bears the Corporate Tax? A Review of What We Know, 20 TAX POL’Y 
& ECON. 1, 1–4 (2006). 
 261 I am grateful to Professor Romano for her insights on this point. 
 262 See John Christensen & Richard Murphy, The Social Irresponsibility of Corporate Tax 
Avoidance: Taking CSR to the Bottom Line, 47 DEVELOPMENT 37 (2004). 
 263 Joel P. Trachtman, Economic Analysis of Prescriptive Jurisdiction, 42 VA. J. INT’L L. 1, 6 (2001) 
(emphasis omitted); see also William W. Bratton & Joseph A. McCathery, The New Economics of 
Jurisdictional Competition: Devolutionary Federalism in a Second-Best World, 86 GEO. L.J. 201, 205, 
231–32 (1997) (critiquing the idea that jurisdictional competition and the “devolution of regulatory 
authority to the state and local level leads to competitive efficiency”). 
 264 Of course, it is important to note that the rise of institutional investors does not necessarily solve 
the age-old agency problem endemic in corporate law. Professors Lucian Bebchuk and Scott Hirst explain 
that index funds like BlackRock—which own an increasingly large proportion of American publicly 
traded companies—tend to underinvest in corporate stewardship. See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Scott Hirst, 
Index Funds and the Future of Corporate Governance: Theory, Evidence, and Policy, 119 COLUM. L. 
REV. 2029, 2030 (2019) (“Our agency-costs analysis shows that index fund managers have strong 
incentives to (i) underinvest in stewardship and (ii) defer excessively to the preferences and positions of 
corporate managers.”). 
 265 Bebchuk, Desirable Limits, supra note 5, at 1485. 
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shareholder value may not be the most socially desirable.266 Corporate law 
issues that have been identified to involve significant externalities range 
from the regulation of takeover bids and proxy contests, the protection of 
creditors, the regulation of corporate disclosure, and the protection of 
constituencies other than providers of capital.267 
While legal regime shopping enabled by entrepreneurial foreign nations 
can strip away undesirable, and perhaps parochial, restraints on private 
contracting, they can also undermine mandatory domestic rules designed to 
effectuate important social policy. According to Professor Jeffrey Gordon, 
for instance, “remedial devices such as the shareholder derivative suit could 
be regarded as regulatory efforts to force the corporation to internalize the 
cost of law compliance.”268 Less tangibly but no less importantly, mandatory 
rules may also shape corporate culture.269 To the extent that these mandatory 
rules are designed in part to remedy negative externalities, welfare gains 
from international jurisdictional competition cannot be taken for granted. 
To be clear, I do not contend that mandatory corporate governance rules 
imposed by Delaware (and other American states) serve to protect the 
general public in the same manner as public laws that mandate minimum 
levels of drinking water quality or prohibit the sale of certain hallucinogenic 
drugs. In corporate law, rules are designed principally to govern the 
relationship between shareholders and managers.270 But they necessarily 
impact how the people who run corporations (managers) deal with other 
 
 266 Id.; see also Ian Ayres, Supply-Side Inefficiencies in Corporate Charter Competition: Lessons 
from Patents, Yachting and Bluebooks, 43 KAN. L. REV. 541, 544 (1995) (theorizing the possibility of 
“market failure in the supply of corporate charters”). 
 267 Bebchuk, Desirable Limits, supra note 5, at 1485–94. 
 268 Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Mandatory Structure of Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1549, 1551–
52 (1989). Other scholars argue that mandatory rules in corporate law serve to facilitate coordination 
problems that can arise between relevant parties. Lewis A. Kornhauser, The Nexus of Contracts Approach 
to Corporations: A Comment on Easterbrook and Fischel, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1449, 1459 (1989) (“[A] 
mandatory term may facilitate the coordination of the multiple contracts that constitute the corporation.”). 
 269 Thus, for instance, Professor Bernard Black observes that “[l]egal rules, such as the duty of 
loyalty owed by managers to shareholders, can affect corporate norms.” Black, supra note 160, at 573; 
see also Melvin Aron Eisenberg, New Modes of Discourse in the Corporate Law Literature, 52 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 582, 590 (1984) (“The function of corporate law . . . is not to forcibly redirect evil human 
nature onto the path of good, but to reinforce and give greater precision to the general inclination to do 
right . . . .”); Lisa M. Fairfax, Easier Said Than Done? A Corporate Law Theory for Actualizing Social 
Responsibility Rhetoric, 59 FLA. L. REV. 771, 777 (2007) (drawing on social psychology literature 
showing that the “more often someone makes a commitment, the more likely she is to engage in 
corresponding behavior”). 
 270 See Roberta Romano, Competition for Corporate Charters and the Lesson of Takeover Statutes, 
61 FORDHAM L. REV. 843, 843 (1993). 
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stakeholders, which could have vast societal consequences.271 For instance, 
a stricter duty to monitor the corporation imposed on directors and officers 
at least in theory could help combat longstanding cultures of sexual 
harassment that appear to be endemic in all too many corporations today.272 
This has important policy implications. If international competition 
chips away at desirable mandatory rules that may not be feasible in the pure 
domestic setting, it requires a renewed discussion as to the proper role of the 
federal government in American corporate law. This is an area of intense 
disagreement among leading scholars in the field, generally split between the 
“race for the top” and “race for the bottom” schools.273 Whereas this debate 
has been thoroughly hashed out in the interstate context, there are simply too 
many unanswered questions in the international context for legal scholars to 
sit on the sidelines and celebrate every time mandatory rules are stripped 
away in the name of efficiency and private choice. 
 
 271 For an excellent discussion of Delaware’s jurisprudence on board oversight, see Elizabeth 
Pollman, Corporate Oversight and Disobedience, 72 VAND. L. REV. 2013, 2016 (2019) (“Shareholders 
cannot be counted on to police corporate illegality, and oversight failures may rarely rise to the level of 
conscious disregard. The fiduciary duty of good faith is neither irrelevant nor toothless, however—it 
embeds a safety valve for public policy in the obligations of fiduciaries that cannot be eliminated.”). 
Examples abound documenting the socially undesirable outcomes produced by managers who are 
presumably accountable to shareholders. See Danielle K. Citron, Cyber Mobs, Disinformation, and Death 
Videos: The Internet as It Is (and as It Should Be), 118 MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020) (reviewing 
NICK DRNASO, SABRINA (2018)) (“Right now, it is cheap and easy to wreak havoc online and for that 
havoc to go viral. Platforms act rationally—some might say responsibly to their shareholders—when they 
tolerate abuse that earns them advertising revenue and costs them nothing in legal liability.”); Sarah E. 
Light, The Law of the Corporation as Environmental Law, 71 STAN. L. REV. 137, 166–67 (2019) (arguing 
that mandatory disclosure to investors is an important tool of environmental governance); Rory Van Loo, 
The Missing Regulatory State: Monitoring Businesses in an Age of Surveillance, 72 VAND. L. REV. 1563, 
1582 (2019) (“One of the theoretical reasons why monitoring may be necessary beyond strong ex post 
deterrence is that people operate in a boundedly rational manner that makes them underestimate the 
likelihood of a bad event happening to them (and to the business they run), such as an oil spill or a bank 
failure.”).  
 272 For a background on the link between sexual harassment and corporate law, see Daniel Hemel & 
Dorothy S. Lund, Sexual Harassment and Corporate Law, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 1583 (2018). 
 273 Compare Stephen M. Bainbridge, Dodd-Frank: Quack Federal Corporate Governance Round II, 
95 MINN. L. REV. 1779, 1821 (2011) (arguing that Dodd-Frank and SOX “erode[] the system of 
competitive federalism that is the unique genius of American corporate law by displacing state regulation 
with federal law”), Jill E. Fisch, Leave It to Delaware: Why Congress Should Stay Out of Corporate 
Governance, 37 DEL. J. CORP. L. 731, 731 (2013) (criticizing the “congressional usurpation of Delaware’s 
traditional role in regulating corporate governance”), and Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and 
the Making of Quack Corporate Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521, 1529 (2005) (“The best path to 
ameliorating the misguided congressional promulgation of substantive governance mandates through 
SOX is to conform them to the states’ enabling approach to corporate law.”), with Lucian A. Bebchuk & 
Assaf Hamdani, Federal Corporate Law: Lessons from History, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1793, 1793 (2006) 
(“[T]he recurring need for federal officials to rectify state law failures in order to provide investors with 
adequate protection indicates that federal lawmaking should be proactive rather than reactive.”). 
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Perhaps most importantly, it is unclear if mandatory rules in Delaware, 
and other American states, are byproducts of federal government oversight 
or simply reflect the wishes of shareholders and managers.274 In the pure 
domestic context, the federal government at least theoretically disciplines 
Delaware from enacting laws that are undesirable from society’s 
standpoint—without actually federalizing corporate law. This is because the 
federal government can usurp state power by federalizing corporate law.275 
Foreign nations do not face such constraints because they are not subject to 
federal oversight. Thus, foreign nations constitute a unique breed of 
lawmakers that may need to be analyzed differently from other states like 
Nevada. The international market at least in theory may be used by domestic 
corporations to bypass mandatory rules found in state corporate law that 
reflect, in part, latent federal oversight.276 
While robust empirical evidence should be a precondition to any major 
reshaping of the federal government’s role in corporate law,277 federal 
intervention may be warranted if international competition is found to erode 
state law-based mandatory rules designed to force private actors to 
internalize negative externalities.278 To the extent that foreign nations allow 
 
 274 An alternative (and persuasive) explanation may be that mandatory rules reflect the wishes of 
powerful local interest groups—namely the Delaware corporate lawyers that benefit from bringing and 
defending shareholder lawsuits brought pursuant to these mandatory rules. See Macey & Miller, supra 
note 43, at 472. Because Delaware faces negligible competition from other states, local lawyers can take 
a sizable financial bite out of Delaware’s corporate law regime, even as proponents of competition argue 
Delaware maintains “the best” corporate governance rules in the United States. See Kahan & Kamar, 
Myth, supra note 28, at 742. 
 275 See Roe, Delaware’s Competition, supra note 5; see also Bebchuk, Desirable Limits, supra note 
5, at 1454 (assessing that Delaware may avoid certain risks in legislating corporate law because “adopting 
such rules might trigger federal intervention”); Chris Brummer, Corporate Law Preemption in an Age of 
Global Capital Markets, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 1067, 1089 (2008) (“Delaware provides law in the shadow 
of the threat of federal intervention, and from this vantage point preemption serves as the primary 
discipline and motivation for efficient laws. Yet even here, the federal government cannot and does not 
monitor all of Delaware’s lawmaking.” (footnote omitted)). 
 276 See Roe, Delaware and Washington, supra note 54, at 9–10 (attributing at least some parts of 
Delaware corporate law as byproducts of latent federal government oversight). 
 277 After all, in some cases, institutional shareholders have been shown to play a significant role in 
demanding governance frameworks that may be socially desirable. Michal Barzuza, Quinn Curtis & 
David H. Webber, Shareholder Value(s): Index Fund Activism and the New Millennial Corporate 
Governance, 93 S. CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020). 
 278 It is worth noting that there may be too little incentive for foreign nations to produce rules with a 
broader societal interest in mind. Cf. Bebchuk, Desirable Limits, supra note 5, at 1485 (“Note the 
difference in this regard between federal and state law. If a rule is designed at the federal level, it is 
possible that officials shaping this rule will take into account the interests of parties other than 
shareholders. But if the rule is designed by the states, then the competition among them will lead state 
law officials to exclude consideration of such interests.”). To be clear, I am not suggesting that the federal 
government is immune to interest groups or has been particularly good at making sound corporate 
governance rules. 
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corporations to opt out of “immutable” rules in place under state law, these 
may be the exact types of areas where leaving rules in the hands of 
“captured” foreign lawmakers risks a lot more than what proponents of 
jurisdictional competition may initially envision. 
CONCLUSION 
A new revolution is quietly emerging in corporate law. In recent 
decades, a handful of small foreign nations have built sophisticated legal 
infrastructures to commercialize their lawmaking authority into a staple 
revenue stream. Aided in part by an elite cadre of foreign lawyers who stand 
to benefit from the development of offshore corporate law havens, 
entrepreneurial foreign nations in offshore islands are emerging suppliers of 
“cutting-edge” corporate law. These jurisdictions, unlike New York or 
California, offer some of the most unadulterated forms of corporate 
governance rules reflecting private sector preferences, setting the stage for a 
globalizing market for corporate law. 
The emergence of an international corporate charter market has been 
largely undetected by domestic corporate law scholars who have for decades 
presupposed an interstate market for corporate law. In addition to 
complicating and refining the race metaphor, this Article highlights the need 
to scrutinize whether unadulterated private ordering built around efficiency 
goals is the only game in town. Until we are comfortable leaving corporate 
governance rules to “captured” lawmakers in small foreign nations, policy 
prescription presupposing interstate corporate charter competition ought to 
be interrogated from the ground up. 
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